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 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 The Country of Origin Information Agencies in Norway and Denmark 
 
As this study is taking place, the European Union is striving for a complete 
harmonisation of asylum policies for its member states and the remaining Schengen 
countries. The goal is to establish a ‘Common European Asylum System’ by the year 
2010, as was expressed at the meeting in Tampere in October 1999, and again in the 
Hague Programme of November 2004.1 
 
Taking part in this harmonisation process are the national Country of Origin Information 
agencies. These are public agencies under the national asylum and immigration 
authorities in each EU member and Schengen state. Country of Origin Information 
(hereafter referred to as COI) is information concerning the humanitarian and security 
situation in a country that produces asylum seekers, where the EU member and Schengen 
states find themselves at the receiving end.  
 
The COI offices provide this expertise to the processors of asylum applications with the 
aim for the latter to have the best possible information at their disposal when deciding 
upon the outcome of an application. The information generally consists of the security 
situation for different groups in the country in need of protection, be it political activists, 
religious or ethnic minorities, women and children, people in need of medical treatment, 
or other persons facing persecution or life-threatening situations in their country of 
origin. As this information is crucial to the processing of asylum applications, this 
                                                
1European Council, 15-16.10.1999. Presidency Conclusions 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm> [24.10.08];  
European Council, 13.12.2004, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the European Union: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf> p. 8 
[24.10.08] 
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component in asylum policy is also subjected to European harmonisation as part of the 
general Common European Asylum System.2 
 
In this master thesis, the EU’s harmonisation process of COI will be studied by looking 
more closely at two institutions, the Norwegian and Danish COI agencies, to see how 
they relate to this process. The offices are named “Landinfo” in Norway and “The 
Documentation and Project Department of the Danish Immigration Service”, 
respectively. These two institutions provide information mainly to two ‘users’. The first 
are the asylum departments of the immigration authorities who process asylum 
applications (the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration and the Danish Immigration 
Service). The second are the national appeals boards (the Norwegian Immigration 
Appeals Board and the Danish Refugee Appeals Board), where asylum seekers receive a 
retrial if their application has been rejected. 
 
The main products that these two offices produce have long been Fact Finding Mission 
reports. The two offices travel on Fact-Finding Missions (hereafter referred to as FFM) to 
countries of origin where they collect information from their sources. Upon return, the 
reports are written with the required updated information. A quote from Kim U. Kjær in 
the article “The Abolition of the Danish de facto Concept” illustrates just how great a role 
FFM reports can have in the processing of asylum applications:  
 
“On 19 June 2002, the Danish Immigration Service published the long awaited fact-
finding report on the situation in Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban regime. 
The contents of the report more than indicate that the processing of these cases, which 
has now been resumed, will result in a far greater number of refusals than previously – 
a view officially shared by the Danish authorities.” 
         Kjær (2003: 269)3 
 
 
                                                
2European Commission, 17.2.2006. New Structures, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision 
Making in the Common European Asylum System 
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0067en01.pdf> p. 5 [15.11.08] 
3 Kjær refers to a reply of 5 July 2002 of the Ministry of Integration to question Nr. S 2251 of 24 June 2002 
from the Parliamentary Integration Committee. 
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1.2. The Research Question 
 
The initial question of this student was whether the harmonisation process for COI is 
actually having its desired effect of making COI reports more harmonised throughout the 
EU/Schengen area. The result would be that, ultimately, processors would have access to 
the same COI, thereby assuring the same processing, regardless of which COI agency is 
consulted. To answer this, one would have to compare reports. Another question was 
whether it would be possible to predict the likely development of the harmonisation 
process that will take place in the years to come. The logic of this study is to firstly 
compare COI reports in order to illustrate the differences that currently exist between 
reports of COI agencies, so as to, secondly, identify which factors could play a role in 
shaping the harmonisation process of COI in the EU in future. For reasons of limited 
resources and restricted access to information, the two above-mentioned COI agencies 
will be studied together with three sets of FFM reports. The main research questions 
thereby follow:  
 
1. What are the differences in FFM reports between the Norwegian and Danish COI 
agencies? 
 
2. What do these differences imply in the context of the EU’s harmonisation process 
of COI? 
 
3. How are the two COI agencies likely to further cooperate in the EU’s 
harmonisation process of COI?  
 
In order to answer the third part of the research question, it will be of central importance 
to identify what factors may intervene in the likelihood of how the two COI agencies will 
cooperate in the harmonisation process in future. Therefore, the following questions will 
be answered: 
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3.a.   How are the agencies organised and which procedures are involved in each 
national COI office to produce the FFM reports? 
 
3.b.   What characterises the bureaucratic context and culture to which the national 
COI offices belong? 
 
3.c.   How do the two agencies currently relate to the different components of the 
EU’s harmonisation process of COI? 
 
3.d.   Are there differences between the two agencies in regards to the three questions 
above? 
 
1.3. Social and Scientific Justification 
 
According to Keohane, King, and Verba, a research question should strive to contribute 
to collective academic research as well as to answer an important substantial question 
(1994: 15). This thesis will attempt to contribute to both the scientific and social arenas. 
The study has social value because the way the COI offices describe the situations in the 
countries of origin influences the procedures of processing asylum applications. Norway 
and Denmark received 6528 and 2225 applications for asylum respectively in 2007, while 
the combined total for all European member and Schengen states was 222635 
applications in the same year.4 Conducting research into how the immigration and asylum 
authorities in European countries currently function as well as providing further 
information on what new tendencies are likely to occur in this field, can help clarify the 
impacts these policies have for individuals such as asylum seekers, for the societies of 
origin, and for the receiving ones in Europe.  
 
                                                
4Eurostat, Asylum Applications. 
<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00021&plugin=
1; NDI, Asylum Applications According to Citizenship 2000-2008. 
<http://udi.no/templates/Statistikk.aspx?id=9831> [5.10.09] 
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This study will make use of new institutional theory. As no comparative research 
between the two COI agencies in question has yet been done,5 the scientific value of the 
study could be seen as a small contribution to the vast field of research in this line of 
theory. Perhaps where the thesis could contribute is within the field of current European 
studies, as it looks at the meeting point where EU policy touches domestic state policy at 
the meso-level of public bureaucratic agencies. A broad pool of scientific research uses 
various forms of new institutional theory to study how national civil servants in public 
administrations relate to policies and cooperation on a supranational level such as the EU 
(Aus 2007; Egeberg and Trondal 2007; Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2008). However, 
Egeberg claims that there is a great need for more research and empirical findings in this 
field, because studies conducted on the subject point to contradictory results (1999: 457). 
It is towards this expressed need for further research in European studies that this thesis 
attempts to contribute.  
 
1.4. Defining Harmonisation 
 
In the study that will follow, the harmonisation process of COI has been defined as a 
handful of forms of cooperation that have been initiated by the EU and that now exist 
among the COI agencies in the EU member and Schengen states. A more elaborate 
presentation of the harmonisation process and its components will follow in chapter four. 
For now, the five main components will be briefly introduced. 
 
The first form of cooperation that was established in 2002 is the Eurasil expert group 
network. This is a forum where COI experts from all EU member and Schengen states, 
accompanied by the UNHCR and other specialist organisations, meet to exchange 
information on countries of origin. 
 
Another form of cooperation that had its first attempts in 2003 is that of national COI 
agencies travelling on joint FFMs. This implies delegations from two or more national 
                                                
5The interviews with the civil servants in the two offices confirmed this statement.  
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COI agencies travelling together to a country of origin where they jointly meet with 
information sources and write a FFM report thereafter.  
 
A third type of cooperation is the creation of the ECS Database. It was established in 
April 2007 as a means of collecting information from COI agencies in the EU/Schengen 
area so as to improve accessibility of information between experts.  
 
A fourth form of cooperation is the project of creating common guidelines for all the EU 
and Schengen COI offices. This project has so far resulted in a written document from 
April 2008, entitled “The Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI”. 
 
Finally, a Joint Support Office is scheduled for 2010 to be responsible for the overall 
supervision and functioning of COI and other forms of cooperation on asylum in the 
EU/Schengen area. 
 
1.5. The Outline of the Thesis 
 
Following this introduction, the methodological choices of strategies used to carry out 
this study are presented and justified in chapter two. In chapter three, four new 
institutional theories are presented as alternative approaches to predict the possible 
likelihood of further cooperation and harmonisation of the two agencies. Chapter four 
aims to place the two cases in their current European and domestic context. The main 
empirical findings will be presented in chapter five. Firstly, three sets of FFM reports are 
compared. Main differences between them will be brought to light, and secondly, what 
these differences imply in the context of the current COI harmonisation process. Finally, 
main tendencies are sketched and compared from the results of the interviews with COI 
experts. Chapter six analyses the data by applying the theoretical propositions from the 
four new institutional perspectives presented in chapter three, and aims to answer the four 
underlying questions of the third part of the research question. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn in chapter seven from the key findings of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODS 
 
 
 
2.1. Defining Research Design and Method 
 
 
Grounded in the thesis’ qualitative and analytical research question (Grønmo 1996: 80), 
the study takes the form of a comparative N=2 research design. This implies the need for 
applying a comparative method as described by Lijphart (1971: 683). Lijphart opposes 
the comparative method to the experimental, the statistical, and the single N=1 case study 
methods, and champions the view that where the other methods show disadvantages, the 
power of causal inference in the comparative small-N method can be both significant and 
the best option most researchers have in a situation of scarce resources (ibid: 685; Aus 
2005: 4-5).  
 
The particular problem this method faces, however, is the situation of having “many 
variables, small number of cases” (Lijphart 1971: 985). In this study, there are only two 
cases: the Norwegian and Danish COI agencies. However, a solution to this dilemma that 
would be suitable for the circumstances of this study would be to choose “comparable 
cases” (ibid: 687). Further developments of this technique have, amongst others, been 
that of the ‘most similar’ and ‘most different design’, or a combination of the two (Collier 
1993: 112). In the context of this study, a ‘most similar design’ will be used, where one 
chooses cases that are as similar as possible, which in turn allows for isolation of factors 
among them that could be responsible for differences of outcome on the dependent 
variable (Martens 2005: 6). 
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One reason for the choice of the two cases was that of all the European COI offices, only 
the Danish, Norwegian, Swedish and British offices were willing to share their COI 
reports.6 Of these four offices, the Norwegian and Danish agencies were chosen as 
appropriate because they are fundamentally similar in many respects. On an institutional 
level, the two agencies have both been known in the European COI context for their 
FFMs and FFM reports for almost two decades. On a state level, Norway and Denmark 
are of approximately the same size in population, are parliamentary democracies with 
established public administrations that have sprung from the centralised-legal state, but 
have later experienced decentralisation and NPM reforms (ibid: 5). On a cultural level, 
they are an example of Lijphart’s claim that cases in the same geographical region most 
often also show signs of similar socio-cultural traits (1971: 689). They are typically 
characterised as homogenous and welfare state orientated (Christensen 2003: 173-4; 
Jørgensen 2007: 377).  
 
Meanwhile, differences remain. Denmark is an old EU member state whereas Norway is 
linked to the EU through the Schengen aquis and the European Economic Area 
agreement. Differences in legislation and public administrative organisation will also 
prove to be relevant during the comparison of the two cases. Following the ‘most similar’ 
comparative design, attention will be paid to whether these differences could have an 
effect on the likelihood of future cooperation of the two agencies in the COI 
harmonisation process. Further similarities and differences between the two cases will be 
elaborated on in chapter four.  
 
2.2. The Benefits of Theory 
 
Another quality to this study is that it is also a theory-interpreting comparative study as 
opposed to an a-theoretical one because it aims to predict an empirical phenomenon by 
using established theory (Andersen 1997: 68). This is another solution to the dilemma of 
                                                
6
Other than the above-mentioned offices, the researcher contacted the COI agencies of Belgium, France, 
Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Switzerland, where the reply was that all COI reports were classified. 
This fact is highly relevant to the subject of legislation on freedom of information concerning COI, which 
will be discussed in later chapters. 
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many variables, small N. Lijphart suggests to “ […] focus the comparative analysis on the 
‘key’ variables” (1972: 690). Following this reasoning, Yin proposes the use of two 
‘general analytical strategies’ (1994: 103). The latter suggests this technique for both 
single- and multiple-case studies (ibid: 14). He explains that in order for the researcher to 
collect analysable data, there must first be a clear idea of and the possibility to rely on the 
theoretical propositions that he/she sees as relevant to the study (ibid: 104). This is the 
first analytical strategy. Yin explains that in this way, the study will use theory as a 
guideline in order to keep the focus on the research question and give priority to the 
evidence that best illustrates the case. The dangers of theoretical assumptions, however, 
is clearly expressed by Allison: “What each analyst sees and judges to be important is not 
a function of the evidence about what has happened, but also of the ‘conceptual lenses’ 
through which he looks at the evidence” (1969: 689). In fact, relying on theoretical 
propositions goes against the ideal of trying to acquire unbiased, objective data to test if 
our theories correspond with social reality.  As a counter to this critique, Yin argues that 
not only does one need to follow theoretical propositions, but the researcher must also 
consider “thinking of rival explanations”, which is his second strategy (1994: 108). By 
according importance to rival explanations before data collection, the researcher can 
search for evidence that points to alternative conclusions. As Checkel points out in his 
research on EU socialisation: “given our concern for better integrating diverse analytic 
traditions, we are thus open to the possible role played by each form of rationality, 
including the instrumental one (2005: 65).  
 
Following this logic, four theoretical approaches within new institutional theory will be 
presented in the following chapter, each with a theoretical proposition that is meant to 
guide the researcher in identifying the essential variables to look for while collecting the 
data. This, in turn, should make the material analysable in the sense of matching the 
pattern of the data with that of the propositions (Yin 1994: 106). In applying the method 
of the two analytical strategies, a separation will be made between the ‘cultural’ new 
institutional theories that are treated as key theoretical propositions, and the rational-
choice perspective that will be considered as the main rival explanation. This separation 
will be described in detail in the following chapter. The aim is for this theoretical 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
10 
diversity to help empirically capture the complex relations that could be at the root of 
how the COI agencies may participate in the harmonisation process in future.  
 
2.3. Data Collection and the Goals of Reliability and Validity 
 
Several types of data have been used for the purpose of responding to the research 
question, whereof the most important contributions have been the FFM reports from the 
two agencies and the qualitative interviews. Other essential data include secondary 
sources that are in electronic form. The nature of this study is such that it deals with 
current events, and therefore much of the information is only available from websites. 
Though one must question the reliability of electronically based sources, the sources that 
have been used here have been carefully selected following the criteria of authority, 
accuracy, objectivity, coverage and currency.7 To insure this, all consulted websites that 
are referred to in this paper come from official sites of national public administrations, 
including that of government, parliament, ministries and directorates; national official 
information sites for legislation and public insight; the official information sites of the 
EU, the Council of Europe and the UNHCR; and press sites from established newspapers 
that keep an open archive. The type of consulted electronic documents have been 
organisational charts, statistics, legal treaties, official communications, research articles, 
and official documents from the EU that are dated and signed. The student has chosen to 
place the references to the electronically based sources as footnotes so that the reader 
may directly consult the links during the course of the thesis. Some primary sources have 
come from direct communication per telephone or e-mail. These have been with official 
civil servants, where their names, titles, and departments, as well as the date of the 
correspondence have been noted. These criteria have been followed in order to insure 
reliability in the sense that another researcher would find the same results if consulting 
the same primary and secondary sources. 
 
The first research question requires a comparison of FFM reports between the Norwegian 
and Danish COI agencies. Three pairs of reports were chosen out of their suitability for 
                                                
7Susan E. Beck, 27.04.2009. Evaluation Criteria. <http://lib.nmsu.edu/instruction/evalcrit.html> [09.07.08] 
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the purpose of comparison: they are FFM reports; they focus on the same country of 
origin; and are written in the same year after a delegation travelled on a FFM. Out of all 
the products of the two agencies, these were the only reports that fulfilled these three 
criteria. The three sets of reports were written on the countries of origin Somalia, Iraq and 
Nigeria. Although the reports on Iraq were written in 2003 before many of the steps of 
the COI harmonisation process were in place, it is argued that this comparison also 
contributes to the study by allowing the researcher to see whether there have been any 
observable changes in resent years. According to Krippendorf, searching for differences 
between documents can take the form of “identifying patterns that have a high degree of 
communality within genres, regardless of particular contents” (2004: 50), but also that 
“analysts may examine differences in the message content generated by two kinds of 
communicators” (ibid: 51). A combination of the two methods was applied: identifying 
patterns and structure without looking at content; and looking at content independently of 
pattern. Thus, a comparison of each set of reports consisted of identifying similarities and 
differences on two main points: the number and type of references consulted (primary 
and secondary sources); and the main structure and content of the reports.  
 
The personal interviews were conducted with four country expert consultants in the 
Norwegian COI agency. The four consultants were responsible for Somalia, Iraq or 
Nigeria respectively, and one was responsible for the ECS Database cooperation. In the 
Danish COI agency, three interviews were conducted: two with country expert 
consultants whereof one was responsible for both Somalia and Nigeria and the second for 
Iraq, and the third interview was with the head of the agency. All the interviews were 
conducted during September 2008. The interviews were in-depth (Rubin and Rubin 2005: 
13) and lasted from one to two hours. The interviewees have been made anonymous for 
the purpose of this study. An interview guide with main and follow-up questions8 was 
used in order to assist the student in staying on track (ibid: 147). The questions were 
open-ended, and probing was used for the purpose of letting the informants elaborate on 
their arguments and acquiring as extensive information as possible within the timeframe 
(ibid: 158; 164). The interviews were either recorded or noted down, depending on the 
                                                
8See Annex A 
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request of the interviewee. For the purpose of reliability, all seven interviews were 
transcribed to create a database (Yin 1994: 95). 
 
It is a goal in scientific research to choose the best method for assuring validity when 
measuring to what extent a research question can be considered explained by a theoretical 
concept. Adcock and Collier argue that: “measurement is valid when the scores, derived 
from a given indicator, can meaningfully be interpreted in terms of the systematized 
concept that the indicator seeks to operationalise” (2001: 531). Applying the terms of 
these authors to this qualitative research study, the indicators, which operationalise the 
four theoretical concepts of new institutional theory that will be presented in the 
following chapter, were the questions in the interviews. How the interviewees responded 
to these questions provided the study with the ‘scores’. The interview guide also proved 
useful in structuring the questions according to the separate theories. The questions were 
formulated with the aim of collecting as diverse a range of observable theoretical 
implications as possible for each theory, thereby improving the scientific quality of the 
research (Keohane, King, Verba 1994: 12).  
 
The empirical findings that resulted from applying the methods sketched above will be 
presented in chapter five. First, however, chapter three will provide the theoretical 
propositions and rival explanations that will guide data collection. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
 
3.1 New Institutionalism and the Three Roles of the Harmonisation Process 
 
This study seeks to understand the causal complexities that take place at the point of 
intersection where the supranational governance of the EU touches domestic policy. At 
this point one finds the domestic civil servants, who carry out national tasks of their 
public administration, are faced with supranational processes of change, in this case the 
EU’s harmonisation process of COI. Many scholars have applied new institutional theory 
in order to identify what takes place within an institution at this point of contact and to 
predict likely future tendencies from such findings (Johnston 2001; Martens 2005). 
Therefore, this line of theories seems fitting also to this study. New institutionalism as an 
overall theoretical concept will be presented along with its classification into four sub-
categories that each represents a new institutionalist theory. Separately, it will be justified 
how each theory applies to the subject of this study.  
 
When looking at how the theories predict a most likely tendency for future cooperation of 
the two agencies in the harmonisation process of COI, a distinction will be made in order 
to highlight three separate roles that the harmonisation process can be perceived to have. 
Sjursen uses three categories to distinguish between three ways of how the EU defines 
itself when studying the EU’s problem of identity in the setting of EU enlargement. 
These are: a “pragmatic problem-solving entity, a rights-based post national union, and a 
value-based community“ (Sjursen 2008: 2). She shows that the EU has used all three of 
these profiles when justifying the enlargement process. These three categories will also 
be used in this study to describe how the theories predict cooperation in regards to these 
three different aspects of the harmonisation process of COI. Applied to this study, if the 
civil servants perceive the harmonisation process as a practical tool to help them in their 
work, then one could interpret this as the agencies understanding the harmonisation 
process as a potentially problem-solving process. The harmonisation of COI, being a 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14 
component of the Common European Asylum System, can also be understood as having 
an aspect of promoting rights that transcend national boarders because it concerns the 
universal right to seek asylum and “is based on the full and inclusive application of the 
Geneva Convention.9 Finally, because it can be seen as a joint cooperation between the 
member states within its borders while defining who of those which are outside its 
borders are allowed entry and membership, the harmonisation process of COI may be 
perceived as a component in strengthening the image of the EU as a social community in 
which its members share a sense of belonging, solidarity, and mutual responsibility. This 
aspect is emphasised by the European Council, which expressed that the Common 
European Asylum System: “should be based on solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility including its financial implications and closer cooperation between the 
member states.”10 The European Commission states that: “Tackling the management of 
asylum together as a Community is the raison d’être of the Common European Asylum 
System.”11 
 
3.1.1 Several New Institutionalist Approaches 
As a response to the theoretical trends of behaviouralism and pure rational choice that 
governed the subject of political science in the 1950s and 1960s, March and Olsen termed 
the new theoretical movement that was emerging in the 1970s ‘new institutionalism’ 
(1984: 738). Their main argument can be said to have been that “collective action should 
be the dominant approach to understanding political life” (Peters 1999: 17), thereby 
criticizing the behaviouralist view that politics are merely the aggregate of individuals 
instead of collective behaviour, motivated solely on the grounds of maximizing self-
interest. They claimed that the latter’s perception was reductionist and utilitarianist as 
well as too contextual, functionalist, and instrumentalist (1984: 735-738). 
 
                                                
9European Council, 13.12.2004. The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the European Union <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf> p. 8 
[12.10.08] 
10 ibid 
11 European Commission, 17.2.2006. New Structures, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision 
Making in the Common European Asylum System 
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2006/com2006_0067en01.pdf> p. 2 [15.11.08] 
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A number of different approaches to institutions have emerged in the last decades since 
March and Olsen assembled and developed the new institutionalist theoretical perspective 
in the 1980s, some deviating more from March and Olsen than others. All classifications 
and categorisations of theories are necessarily artificial to some degree. Therefore, 
although there is a general understanding that new institutionalist approaches diverge, 
there seems to be a certain disagreement as to how to separate them. Scott separates the 
new institutionalists into three pillars based on which part of the institution they accord 
most weight (1995: 35). He calls these pillars the normative, cognitive, and the regulative 
pillars. The normative pillar seems to correspond to Peters’ (1999) normative and 
historical new institutionalism, where norms and values are at the centre of the analysis. 
Peters argues that historical institutionalism could be treated simply as an under-category 
of normative institutionalism, with a special interest in history (1999: 75). However, here 
the approach, along with its main characteristics, will be presented on its own, as both 
Peters (1999: 63) and Hall and Taylor (1996: 937) do. Scott’s cognitive pillar emphasizes 
culture as a shared social reality. This is in line with Peters’ sociological institutionalism. 
Hall and Taylor, on the other hand, make a somewhat different distinction. Indeed, Peters 
argues that: “Hall and Taylor, in fact, refer somewhat incorrectly to the March and Olsen 
version of institutionalism as sociological institutionalism” (1999: 98). When it comes to 
the regulative pillar, however, there seems to be more agreement as to this being the most 
moderate of the new institutional approaches, represented by the rational choice version 
of new institutionalism (Peters 1999; Hall and Taylor 1996). 
 
A distinction influenced by these three contributions of scholars will be made to present 
the four theoretical approaches that follow. First, the new rational choice institutionalist 
approach will be presented, which is said to build upon the basic assumptions of the 
pedigree rational choice model. Then follows the three approaches that seem more 
closely related: the normative, sociological, and historical new institutionalist 
perspectives. 
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3.2. Rational Choice New Institutionalism 
 
Peters suggests that the term ‘rational choice institutionalism’ may seem contradictory 
(1999: 43). Given that conventional rational choice theorists analysed politics from a 
basis in individualistic behaviour, they did not accord importance to the institutions in 
political life. The new rational choice institutionalists, although sharing this basic 
individualistic perception, acknowledge that institutions matter and that most behaviour 
takes place within an institutional context.  
 
These scholars look at formal and informal rules, contracts, enforcement, and sanctions, 
which constitute the institutional context that constrains behaviour. They tend to study 
actors in a competitive situation, such as the marked where interests are conflicting, and 
where rules are necessary to regulate and control behaviour (Scott 1995: 36). A way to 
obtain control is through coercion and laws, executed from a third party. Here is where 
rational choice institutionalists see the need and the role of the state and of governance 
(ibid).   
 
Rational choice institutionalists believe that the individual is rational, but that this 
rationality is ‘bounded’ in the sense that institutions constrain the possible alternatives of 
individual choices. Still, this is the new institutional theory in which “individuals are the 
central actors in the political process” (Peters 1999: 46). Preferences are seen to be 
exogenous to the institution and are taken as given, natural, universal, and utilitarian 
because all individuals seek to maximise self-interest, such as power, status and 
economic benefit. The theory sees the individual as calculating, so that while taking a 
decision, one evaluates the multiple alternatives and their consequences in a cost versus 
benefit logic. This is why March and Olsen name this perspective ‘the logic of 
consequentiality’ (Christensen and Røvik 1999: 160). Yet it is acknowledged that 
individuals, in certain situations, may benefit from an institutional framework. This is 
because their competitors are also constrained. Institutions therefore serve instrumentally 
as ‘tools’ for individuals to reach their private goals. They provide stability and ‘the rules 
of the game’ that can diminish transaction costs for all participants. Therefore, actors may 
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have an incentive to join an institution, interacting strategically so that the institution can 
serve the actor’s individual interests.  
 
Through this logic, rational choice institutionalists show how rational individual action 
can lead to collective rationality (Peters 1999: 45). The ‘game theorists’ of this approach 
call this a state of ‘equilibrium’, where the players, by following the rules, reach their 
best possible outcome. Institutions are perceived to be consciously designed to produce 
favourable outcomes for the actors. Furthermore, these designs can be easily altered to fit 
changes in the environment, in information, and in their desired goals. According to this 
perspective, the past history of the institution is of little importance. The designs are in 
fact perceived to be “formed on a tabula rasa” (ibid: 47). This stands in sharp contrast to 
the historical institutionalist perspective, which is presented later in this chapter. 
 
3.2.1 Rational Choice Applied to this Case.  
When using this theory to study how the two COI offices relate to the EU’s initiative to 
harmonise COI, one could suggest that the civil servants will prove to apply a strategic 
calculation approach to EU cooperation, depending also on the degree of freedom of 
decision-making they enjoy within the institutional framework of formal organisation and 
procedures. In this sense, rational choice theory suggests that the civil servants perceive 
the role of the EU as a problem-solver (Sjursen 2008: 2). This could explain two trends. 
On the one hand, their COI reports could become more harmonised according to EU 
standards because it seems in fact beneficial for the actors to cooperate at the EU 
supranational level. On the other hand, if adaptation to EU standards seems unbeneficial, 
the bureaucrats may choose not to focus on cooperation. Rational choice theory suggests 
that the process of changing the design of the institution according to changes of the 
incentives from the environment is likely and poses no considerable problems to the 
designers. Therefore, the first theoretical proposition is the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18 
The Norwegian and Danish COI institutions will be in favour of the 
harmonisation process if the civil servants are of the opinion that it is beneficial 
for them to cooperate. This alteration can take place rapidly and easily. If they 
feel that it is not beneficial, they will be reluctant to further cooperation. 
 
3.3. Normative New Institutionalism 
 
March and Olsen were the fathers of this approach (Peters 1999: 25). They stressed the 
importance of norms and values in institutions, and that these institutions shape 
individual behaviour. Scott defines values as that which is desired, and norms as the 
means of how to achieve these preferred goals by specifying what should be done and 
how (1995: 37). Yet March and Olsen (1984) were not the first ones to claim the 
importance of values in an institution. Amongst others, March and Olsen were highly 
influenced by sociologists such as Selznick, who in 1957 argued that an organisation 
becomes an institution when it is completely infused by values (Selznick 1997: 41). It 
evolves from being a mere technical tool to becoming, through the process of 
institutionalisation, a place of social integration and patterned behaviour (ibid). Thus, 
normative institutionalists believe that individuals, far from being atomistic, are 
‘embedded’ in collective relationships with each other. March and Olsen claimed that 
individuals act in the manner of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Christensen and Røvik 
1999: 159). In this logic, they explain that identities are created when individuals follow 
rules and standard operating procedures that they feel are appropriate to the situations 
they face. They ‘match’ the appropriate action to a situation in the way that is expected of 
them. In this sense, the actor’s preferences are said to be endogenous to the institution as 
a result of socialisation into the latter (ibid: 161). Krasner refers to how individuals’ 
identities are shaped by the institution as ‘vertical depth’ and claims that these norms 
leave individuals with a limited number of social values and roles from which they can 
choose (1988: 73). Similarly, March and Olsen stress that individuals are not puppets to 
socialisation, but that they “pick and choose” from rules and roles that are available to 
them (Peters 1999: 26).  Also Egeberg explains that normative institutionalism sees 
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individuals as a collection of roles and identities, and that which of these is awoken 
depends on the situation (1999: 458).  
 
The logic of appropriateness stands in sharp contrast to the logic of consequentiality 
described above. The latter is typical for what March and Olsen term the ‘aggregative 
political process’ (1989: 118). They focus on the opposite pole, seeing the political 
process through an ‘integrative model’. It stresses that collectives have a common and 
shared history and future, wherein lay common values and norms that define how the 
political process should proceed. The norms and values are insured by political rights and 
reasoned deliberation (March and Olsen 1989: 124). They create “shared preferences 
[…], common cultures, collective identities, belonging, bonds, mutual affection, shared 
visions, symbols, history, mutual trust, and solidarity” (ibid: 127).  
 
3.3.1 Normative Institutionalism Applied to this Case 
There may be two sets of norms and values of interest in this study. One set consists of 
the domestic norms that characterise each national institution. Some norms and values 
may seem particularly prominent in each office, giving them a unique character and 
competence. This could differentiate them from other institutions and might create 
obstacles to adopting new norms, thereby making the harmonisation process of COI 
harder to achieve. On the other hand, there are the norms and values which have 
developed within the EU that might also be strong binding factors to the civil servants 
who may begin to feel that it is appropriate and expected of them to adopt these norms. 
One might detect a change in the collective identity of the bureaucrats that will manifest 
itself in a willingness to cooperate in the harmonisation process. If this is the situation, 
the institution would not adapt rapidly to the new environment, but if adopted, the norms 
and values from the EU institutional level will create a more permanent change than what 
rational choice theory suggests. In regards to how the civil servants perceive the role of 
the harmonisation process, this depends on which norms and values are predominant. If 
the domestic norms and values are dominant and conflicting with those of the EU, there 
might be scepticism towards what the harmonisation process can achieve. However, if 
there is a tendency towards adopting the EU’s supranational values, it might be that there 
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is agreement on the potential for the harmonisation process to promote universal rights to 
asylum, perhaps even to strengthen the aspect of the EU as a shared community by taking 
on new identities. Therefore, a second theoretical proposition follows: 
 
Strong domestic norms and values may create resistance amongst the civil 
servants against the harmonisation process. Yet if the officials show signs of 
adopting the common norms and values of the EU’s harmonisation initiative, this 
could suggest that the movement towards further cooperation and harmonisation 
of COI is a slow but sure one. 
 
3.4. Historical New Institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalists share the same view as normative institutionalists in that 
institutions influence individual preferences, and that an institution has a uniqueness 
resulting from its particular history. Selznick insisted on analysing the institution in a 
historical perspective. He argued that the past choices that the leaders of the institution 
make, the “choice of a social basis”, “the formation of an institutional core”, and “the 
formalising of methods” (1997: 81-84) will persist, resulting in institutional stability and 
slow evolution, as well as giving the institution its own character, identity and 
competence (ibid: 104).  
 
Historical institutionalists insist on the historical contextual circumstances in which ideas 
were born in the initial development of the institution (Hall and Taylor: 1996: 940). As 
such, historical institutionalists typically address the persistence of patterns and policies 
over time within individual countries that amount to cross-national differences. For these 
scholars, causal analysis is understood as sequence analysis (Thelen 1999: 390), or as 
Krasner points out, “institutional arrangements are both dependent variable at time t and 
an independent variable at time t+1” (1988: 72). Krasner explains how institutions persist 
because they follow a ‘path dependency’, the process by which “pre-existing structures 
delimit the range of possible options” (1988: 81). He compares this to the biological 
‘genetic stock’ which allows us to develop only in a certain way. He refers to routines 
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e.g. “regular and predictable pattern of behaviour” in institutional theory as the equivalent 
of genes in evolutionary theory: “a persistent feature of the organism [that] determines its 
possible behaviour” (ibid 83).  
 
This does not, however, imply that path dependency is static. Thelen argues that, on the 
contrary, the development is a dynamic process (1999: 391). It starts off at a ‘critical 
juncture’ in which initial choices, ideas and influences all intertwine in a historical 
context to set institutions off on different development paths (ibid: 388). Contrary to what 
the rational choice institutionalists believe, this original birth of the institution is not seen 
as the result of conscious, rationalistic design. Rather, it is the product of the “political 
forces at play at the time of the formation of the institution” (Peters 1999: 72). This path 
reproduces itself in a process of  ‘self-reinforcing positive feedback’ (Krasner 1988: 83). 
A result of this process, Krasner argues, is typically that routines become more efficient 
over time. These routines, however, exclude other routines that might have been better 
suited for the changing environment. Change is costly, but in the long run, he claims, the 
cost of path dependency might exceed the cost of change (ibid: 84). Thelen, in turn, 
warns of the tendency of the approach to be “overly deterministic” by not according 
enough importance to evolution and change in the institution (1999: 396).  She argues 
that certain changes in the environment can create changes in the institution if the 
pressures of the environment are significant. However, in order to understand which 
environmental changes create changes in which institutions, one must direct one’s 
attention to the particular reproduction mechanisms of the institution in question. 
Consequentially, institutional change cannot be separated from the analysis of 
institutional stability (ibid: 400). The variation of reproduction processes can explain how 
international trends can have different domestic outcomes, some more resilient to change 
and reform than others (ibid: 397).   
 
3.4.1 Historical Institutionalism Applied to this Case 
The two COI agencies may prove to have strong domestic principles and guidelines that 
are firmly sealed into their bureaucratic tradition whereby norms and values have sprung 
out from the forces that were at work when these bureaucracies were formed. One would 
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then observe a path dependent development, in which foundational principles are 
reproduced over time. The actors will then seem to have considerably restricted options 
when facing changes in the environment. Unless environmental conditions surrounding 
the institution create such strain that it is faced with a ‘critical juncture’ that will set the 
institutions off on a new path, change is a problematic and slow process. The firm 
domestic norms and routines could help to explain lasting differences in the domestic 
offices when faced with a changing environment such as the EU’s wish to harmonise 
COI. As for how the role of the harmonisation process is understood, the same applies as 
for normative institutionalism, but with emphasis on the perception of the civil servants 
proving to be long lasting and a challenge to alter. The third proposition is thus: 
 
If the two institutions were faced with a critical juncture when the EU’s harmonisation of 
COI was introduced, this could have set the offices on a new development path, which 
would materialise in the form of further cooperation and more harmonised COI. If there 
was no such critical juncture, the COI agencies might refrain from cooperation because 
the civil servants are embedded in a domestic institution that is so path-dependent of its 
bureaucratic traditions that any considerable changes towards harmonisation are 
unlikely or will be slow at best. 
 
3.5. Sociological New Institutionalism 
 
Even though sociological institutionalism shares many common features with that of the 
normative perspective, especially from its emphasis on culture and socialisation, both 
Scott (“the cognitive pillar” 1995: 40) and Peters (1999: 97) argue that it deserves its own 
category. Sociological institutionalists also emerged as a reaction to the rational choice 
trends of the 1950s and 1960s and are equally inspired by sociologists such as Selznick, 
who championed the view that frames of meaning come to life through the process of 
institutionalisation and social interaction (1997: 26). Yet where normative institutionalists 
ask which behaviour is appropriate to a given situation, Scott recites early cognitive 
theorists such as Berger and Luckmann (1967) who ask how the individual comes to 
interpret the situation by his/her understanding of social reality (Scott 1995: 40). 
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Similarly, Hall and Taylor explain that sociological institutionalists do not focus on what 
an individual should do as much as ask “what one can imagine oneself doing in a given 
context” (1996: 948).  
 
Sociological institutionalists are primarily interested in the cognitive aspect of culture in 
which symbols play an important role as carriers of shared meaning. According to this 
view, individuals construct social reality “within the context of wider, pre-existing 
cultural systems: symbolic frameworks, perceived to be both objective and external, that 
provide orientation and guidance” (Scott 1995: 41). Individuals internalise this 
institutional context so that however they understand reality will be taken in a manner 
that intuitively makes sense to them.  
 
Hall and Taylor suggest that Meyer and Rowan (1991), as well as DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), were the founders of the sociological institutionalist tradition in the late 1970s 
(1996: 947). Sociological institutionalists argue that culture consists of external, macro-
level belief systems in society that they refer to as ‘social myths’. Myths are spread and 
adopted by organisational fields, which often adapt modern and rational organisational 
forms for reasons of legitimacy rather than efficiency. Myths provide a common 
definition of social reality, therefore creating similar practices within and between 
organisations in an isomorphic manner (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 46). Accordingly, 
where historical institutionalists seek to explain the uniqueness of an institution, the 
sociological researchers rather ask why there is a high degree of similarity between them. 
More precisely, DiMaggio and Powell argue that “highly structured organisational fields 
provide a context in which individual efforts to deal rationally with uncertainty and 
constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to homogeneity in structure, culture, and output” 
(1983: 147). They present three main forms in which institutional isomorphism takes 
place between institutions that share the same field. The first is mimetic, a process of 
imitation where institutions facing uncertainty want to copy the ‘best practice’ of the 
‘model’ institutions who appear to be successful, rational, and modern. The second is 
coercive isomorphism, where institutions in an environment enforce considerable 
pressure on other institutions so as to create no other alternatives than to conform. This 
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could come from its dependency on the others or from strong cultural expectations in the 
field, but also from direct imposition through laws and political decisions. The last type 
of institutional isomorphism is normatively driven, in which a process of 
professionalisation occurs in a field, defined as “the collective struggle of members of an 
occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work” (ibid: 152). This process 
can develop through the educational system and professional networking. 
 
Another angle on this theory is to focus on the micro level of the socialisation processes 
that take place when an actor’s perception of reality is altered. It is suggested that 
supranational institutions can be seen as social laboratories where one can observe the 
socialisation of national officials into another institutional level. When confronted with a 
new institutional culture, new symbols are introduced that carry social meanings and 
cognitive constructs which, in turn, are internalised by the actors. Johnston quotes Berger 
and Luchmann’s definition of socialisation as “the comprehensive and consistent 
introduction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it”, and 
adds “socialisation is aimed at creating membership in a society where the intersubjective 
understandings of the society become taken for granted” (Johnston 2001: 494). 
Furthermore, he specifies that socialisation takes the form of both persuasion and social 
influence. Johnston recites Berger’s (1995) definition on persuasion: “[it] alters people’s 
perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and motivations” (ibid: 496). Social influence is understood 
as a system that provides rewards or punishments in status and merit, depending on the 
cultural understanding of what is “socially valuable behaviour” (ibid: 501).  
 
3.5.1. Sociological Institutionalism Applied to this Case 
DiMaggio and Powell formulate the hypothesis that “the greater the participation of 
organisational managers in trade and professional associations, the more likely the 
organisation will be, or will become, like other organisations in its field” (1983: 155). 
Applied to this study, one could suppose that participation and cooperation at the EU 
level could lead to greater institutional isomorphism between the COI agencies, which in 
this case could also lead to more harmonisation of their products. One might see signs of 
mimetic, coercive or normative/professional isomorphic processes taking place between 
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them. Similarly, Johnston argues that the microprocesses of socialisation are more likely 
to take place when “the actor is exposed to counter attitudinal information repeatedly 
over time” (2001: 499). The exposure could lead to a more ‘European’ orientation, where 
goals such as harmonisation of policies, or a sense of a shared European community and 
future European fate, take precedence over traditional national references and identities. 
Here, the harmonisation process for COI could be interpreted as taking the role of a 
community provider and a rights-promoter in the sense that the civil servants feel a sense 
of belonging to the EU and agree with the goals and abilities of the harmonisation 
process. Yet, Johnston notes that socialisation is less likely if an actor has strongly 
ingrained former attitudes that conflict with those that are introduced (ibid). This can be 
interpreted as an obstacle to harmonisation. The fourth proposition is formulated as 
follows:  
 
The COI of the offices will become more harmonised as a result of isomorphic 
processes as the civil servants participate in the five forms of cooperation. This 
participation influences the perception of the bureaucrats who are undergoing a 
process of socialisation into a supranational institutional culture. However, if 
domestic socialisation is strong, this can delay and challenge harmonisation. 
 
3.6. Summary 
 
Although the introduction in this overview of new institutionalism questioned whether 
and how it makes sense to separate the concept into several under-categories of new 
institutionalist approaches, this presentation of each theory shows differences between 
them so that it seems justifiable to separate them. Notably the fundamental difference 
between the rational choice new institutionalism and the other three approaches, where 
preferences are seen as universal and exogenous as opposed to endogenous and culturally 
defined, is an important contrast. In this respect, when applied to the topic of this study, 
the theoretical proposition based on the rational choice approach will be interpreted as a 
rival explanation (Yin 1994: 108) to the other three. As this chapter has shown, this 
division can also be justified by how the different theories point to different perceptions 
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of the COI harmonisation process. It is suggested that rational-choice theory sees the 
harmonisation process as a potential problem-solver. As for the cultural perspectives, 
differences appear to lie in what is in focus when an institution is studied: the norms of 
what is appropriate behaviour; the historical origins and developments; or the cognitive 
aspect of what can be imagined. These differences, in turn, can contribute to explaining 
different phenomena of uniqueness or similarity amongst institutions. Accordingly, the 
cultural theories can also be concerned with other aspects of the harmonisation process of 
COI, where its abilities as a promoter of universal rights to asylum and its role as a 
provider of a defined European community are questioned. The theoretical propositions 
that were formulated here are meant to assist the research during data collection and 
analysis. Therefore, the following model has been drawn as a guide for the task ahead.12 
However, before proceeding to those steps of the research, the European and domestic 
context to which the two COI agencies belong will be presented in the following chapter. 
                                                
12 See Annex B 
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CHAPTER 4. THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION AGENCIES IN THEIR 
EUROPEAN AND DOMESTIC CONTEXT 
 
 
In this chapter, a historical overview of the developments in European asylum policies 
will be presented in order to identify the main events that have resulted in the COI 
harmonisation process in which the two COI agencies currently find themselves. In the 
second part of this chapter, the two national offices will be introduced in more detail 
within their domestic setting in the Norwegian and Danish bureaucracies and national 
legislations. Finally, the third part of the chapter will describe the point of contact 
between these two contexts, down to the level of the two COI agencies. 
 
4.1. The Steps Towards a Common European Asylum System and the COI 
Harmonisation Process 
 
4.1.1. The Starting Point: the Conventions 
The refugee and asylum policies in Europe can be said to have gotten their first written 
forms in the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees  (the Geneva 
Convention) of 1951 and in the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of 1950.  
 
The Geneva Convention was initially created to protect European refugees in the 
aftermath of World War II. The Convention clearly defines who is considered to be a 
refugee.  It lays down basic minimum standards for legal protection, assistance, and 
social rights whom the persecuted should receive from the contracting states, as well as 
his or her obligations to these host countries. Article 1 defines a refugee as: 
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" […] a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence, has 
a well founded fear of persecution because of his or her race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, and is unable or unwilling 
to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of 
persecution ".
13  
 
The 1967 Protocol removed the time and space limitations of the original Convention to 
create a universal instrument for the problem of displaced persons. 147 countries have 
signed one or both texts, including all the EU and Schengen member states. This action 
on behalf of the member states obliges them to respect the principle that refugees should 
not be returned to a country where they fear persecution: the principle of ‘non-
refoulement’. 
 
The European Council drafted the European Convention of Human Rights. Unlike the 
UN Convention, it is not solely directed towards asylum issues but to protecting human 
rights and freedoms in Europe.14 In order to assure the protection of these rights, the 
Convention established the European Court of Human Rights, created in 1959. Although 
the original Convention did not stress that European states could not deport individuals to 
recipient countries where such fundamental rights were not respected, the Court has later 
ruled that individuals cannot be deported to recipient states where “torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment” is practiced, as expresses Article 3. The Convention 
includes several protocols that have also proved relevant in the Court’s decisions on 
asylum issues, such as Protocol 13 that abolishes death penalty without exception. It 
represents a basic foundation of human rights as all the member states have ratified the 
Convention. 
 
4.1.2. The Schengen Convention, the Dublin Convention, and Eurodac 
The subsequent legal framework that laid the ground for European refugee and asylum 
                                                
13UNHCR, 1.09.2007. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees  
<www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf> [23.07.08] 
14Council of Europe. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
Amended by Protocol No. 11 
 <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm> [15.08.08] 
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issues was the Schengen Convention. It was based on the Schengen agreement of 1985 
and came into effect in 1995. Together, the original agreement, the Convention, the 
protocols, and later agreements constitute the Schengen acquis. 
 
The Schengen Convention removed the checks at internal borders, but also created a 
single frontier by establishing a joint cooperation for immigration and asylum at the 
external borders, including so-called compensatory measures that were put in place such 
as setting up a common visa policy and the Schengen Information System for police and 
judicial authorities to share information on persons and goods.  
 
Also in 1990, although not enforced until 1997, the Dublin Convention was signed. This 
convention stated that asylum applications should only be processed in one Schengen 
country, the country of ‘first contact’. This Convention would be replaced by the Dublin 
!! Regulation in 2003, accompanied by the fingerprint register Eurodac, which assists the 
authorities in identifying the member state where the asylum seeker first entered the 
EU/Schengen area (Aus 2007: 20; 23). 
 
4.1.3.  Schengen Takes its Place in the Treaty of Amsterdam 
The Schengen acquis was incorporated into the legal and institutional framework of the 
EU by the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997. Subsequently, the control of external 
borders, asylum, and immigration were all placed under the first, Community Pillar of the 
EU. Title IV of the treaty deals specifically with the subject of free movement of persons, 
asylum, immigration, and judicial cooperation in civil matters. It set a deadline of five 
years for the member states to agree on minimum criteria and standards for: qualifying as 
a refugee; the reception of asylum-seekers; determining which country is responsible for 
processing an application; and procedures in granting refugee status.15 As COI is part of 
this procedure, this component too was submitted to future standardisation.  
 
                                                
15Europa. The Gradual Establishment of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a11000_en.htm> 
[24.07.08] 
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4.1.4. Tampere and the Hague Programme: Common Legislation and Towards Several 
Forms of Practical Cooperation 
The meeting in Tampere in October 1999 translated the goals of the Amsterdam Treaty 
into practice on the subject of Justice and Home Affairs, including a common EU asylum 
and immigration policy. A Common European Asylum System was decided upon, 
determining the first standards and measures to be established by 2004. The intension 
was to arrive at a “common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are 
granted asylum valid throughout the Union”.16  
 
As a result of these decisions, the ARGO Programme was established for the period 2002 
to 2006, for the purpose of supplying funding for cooperation between the national 
administrations in the fields of asylum, visas, immigration, and external boarders.17 The 
first form of cooperation on COI was the Eurasil expert group network, founded in 
2002.18 This is a forum where COI experts meet from all EU member and Schengen 
states, accompanied by UNHCR. Depending on the agenda, various COI experts and 
corresponding specialist organisations are invited to participate and exchange 
information. According to Gornitzka and Sverdrup who base their findings on the total of 
1237 expert groups registered in 2007, such expert groups assisting the European 
Commission are becoming increasingly influential in a EU that is characterised by 
multilevel governance (2007: 29). The ARGO Programme also financed the first joint 
FFMs in 2003, where delegations from two or more national COI agencies travel 
together, interview sources, and finally write a common report. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the Eurasil meetings and the joint FFMs are two of the five main forms of 
cooperation that are included in this thesis’ definition of the EU’s harmonisation process 
of COI. 
 
                                                
16European Council, 15-16.10.1999. Presidency Conclusions 
<www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en9.htm> [24.07.08] 
17Europa. ARGO - External Borders, Asylum, Visas and Immigration  
 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/2004_2007/argo/funding_argo_en.htm> [27.07.08] 
18European Commission, 17.2.2006. New Structures, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision 
Making in the Common European Asylum System; Annexes 
 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/docs/sec_2006_189_en.pdf> p. 9 [15.08.08] 
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The Hague Programme of 2004 evaluated the first steps of the Common European 
Asylum System, e.g. legislation and practical cooperation between the member states, 
and set the agenda for the next five years. An Action Plan was adopted, which specified 
the steps towards the goal of a fully harmonised Common European Asylum System. 
This system is to be in place by 2010 together with a European Support Office to oversee 
all cooperation, including COI, between member states.19 The office is therefore 
considered another component of the COI harmonisation process. 
 
Another forum for cooperation between the EU/Schengen countries established in 2004 
was the General Directors of Immigration Services Conference network (GDISC). It was 
through GDISC that the ECS Database was founded in April 2007.20 This database was 
created for the purpose of sharing COI between the members and is therefore included as 
a forth component in COI harmonisation. It is meant to function in such a way that 
certain expert from different COI agencies become official contacts for a given country 
of origin. Other experts seeking information can then contact them, and the answers are 
made available to all the EU/Schengen COI experts. 
 
4.1.5. The Fifth Form of COI Cooperation 
In a Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament in 2006, there was a call to strengthen practical cooperation based on the 
goals set from the Hague Programme.21 Two directives were mentioned, namely the 
Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive. The first defines the 
“minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals and 
stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection”.22 The second specifies the “minimum standards on procedures in member 
                                                
19European Council, 10.06.2005. Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague 
Programme on Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/action_plan_jai_207_en.pdf> p. 6-7 [18.08.08] 
20GDICS, 25-26.10.2007. 3rd GDISC Asylum Conference 
 <http://www.gdisc.org/uploads/tx_gdiscdb/Conclusions_GDISC_Asylum_Conference-final.pdf> p. 2 
[18.08.08] 
21European Commission, 17.2.2006. New Structures, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision 
Making in the Common European Asylum System, Annexes 
<www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/docs/sec_2006_189_en.pdf> [26.07.08] 
22 ibid: 2 
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states for granting and withdrawing refugee status”.23 Article 4 of the Qualification 
Directive states that: 
“[…] the assessment of an application for international protection should take into 
account all relevant facts as they relate to the Country of Origin”.
24
 
 
Article 7 of the Asylum Procedures Directive requires member states to ensure that:  
“[…] precise and up to date information is made available to personnel responsible for 
examining applications and taking decisions”.
25
  
 
These two directives called for greater practical cooperation on the “joint compilation, 
assessment and application of Country of Origin Information”.26 The Commission also 
expressed its intention to establish “common guidelines on the production of COI”.27 The 
result is a document dated April 2008, entitled “Common EU Guidelines for Processing 
Country of Origin Information”.28 This document was the result of a joint effort of the 
immigration authorities in Germany, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Poland, and the UK, and is interpreted in this thesis as the fifth form of 
cooperation within the COI harmonisation process.  
 
The report describes in detail the standards for COI that are agreed upon at the EU level. 
The report consists of three parts, where the first supplies specific guidelines for how the 
COI experts must select and validate their sources, following the quality criteria of 
relevance; reliability; currency; objectivity; accuracy; traceability; and transparency.29 
This first part of the document proceeds to describe every step of the actual report 
writing, also annexing a preferred format for a COI report.30 The second part of the report 
clearly states the risks involved in the distribution of COI and suggests harmonisation by 
                                                
23 ibid 
24 ibid: 9  
25 ibid 
26 ibid: 2  
27 ibid: 11  
28
 European Commission, April 2008. Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI 
<http://www.bfm.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/migration/laenderinformationen/herkunftslaenderinformation
en.Par.0003.File.tmp/COI_Leitlinien-e.pdf> [16.09.08] 
29 ibid: 12 
30 ibid: 39 
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operating with three different zones of classified versus publicly accessible COI. In this 
way, it is argued, the experts can be assured that the information exchange will respect 
the same classification. The third part of the document is a glossary, defining words often 
used in the context of COI processing. This document can be seen as an illustration of 
how detailed the harmonisation process of COI has become.  
 
4.2. The Two COI Agencies in their Domestic Context 
 
4.2.1. Bureaucratic Organisation and Institutional Reforms: the Start of the two COI 
Agencies 
The Danish Immigration Service (DIS) was founded in 1984 as a result of according 
immigration cases their own administrative unit separate from the police.31 The Danish 
Refugee Appeals Board (RAB) was also founded in the same year. The two institutions 
took over the role of the Ministry of Integration to process asylum applications, and the 
latter could from then on only steer immigration policy through rules and legislation. 
However, it was first in 1996 that the DIS took over the process of interviewing the 
asylum seekers. A substantial internal reform came in 2006-2007, when the Directorate’s 
name changed to it’s current one. As the name suggests, the reform consisted of a set of 
internal modernisation initiatives that were influenced by the Danish version of NPM 
marked-orientated ideals.  
 
In comparison, Norway has experienced a “reform fever” in its administration of 
immigration (Christensen and Lægreid 2009: 26). The Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration (NDI) was established in 1988 under the Ministry of Local Government to 
take care of both the integration part and the regulatory part of immigration. The work of 
interviewing was moved from the police to the directorate in 2000. However, the control 
over the appeals was under the Ministry of Justice until 2001 when the Norwegian 
Immigration Appeals Board (IAB) was founded in a new reform of the immigration 
                                                
31 All the information contained in this paragraph comes from e-mail and telephone correspondence with 
Morten Bo Laursen, Head of Information of the Communication and Director Stab, DIS, April 30, 2009, as 
he explained there are no official written documents or articles that present an overview of the history of 
the DIS. 
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administration. The Ministry could then only interfere through legislation, and this gave 
both the NDI and the IAB far more independence than prior to the reform (ibid: 12). Yet 
due to a shift in government, a new reorganisation took place in 2005 to re-establish more 
political control (ibid: 15). The ministry would as a general rule not interfere in 
individual cases, yet was given the possibility to interfere in specific cases within the 
decision-making process between the NDI and the IAB. The NDI was split into two parts 
in 2006, when the Directorate of Integration and Diversity was established to handle the 
integration part of immigration, leaving the NDI with asylum regulation. Both 
directorates are now under the new Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion. As for the 
influence of NPM, according to Christensen and Lægreid, the later reforms were 
characterised by a mixture of the traditional Norwegian bureaucratic model, NPM, and 
post-NPM features (ibid: 26).  
 
The Danish COI office was established in 1993 as part of the DIS, but it was only in 1996 
that it took its current form as a substantial documentation office.32 It was also put in 
charge of some specific cooperation projects, hence the name Documentation and Project 
Department. The Norwegian office “Landinfo” was founded in 2005. Prior to this, the 
departments of COI documentation had been two units, one under the NDI, and one 
under the IAB. These were then merged into one office that was administratively placed 
under the NDI.33  
 
When comparing the two COI agencies in the context of their directorates under which 
they are administratively placed, some differences can be detected. The Danish COI 
office is located on the organisational chart of the DIS directly under the Vice Director,34 
whereas the Norwegian COI office is not included in the organisational chart of the 
NDI.35 The names of the two agencies also differ. The Danish office, the Documentation 
and Project Department, is a sub-category of the DIS, whereas Landinfo has its own, 
                                                
32 Telephone correspondence with Jens Weise Olesen, country of origin expert consultant of the 
Documentation and Project Department of the DIS, May 9, 2009. 
33Landinfo, 06.07.09. About Landinfo <http://landinfo.no/index.gan?id=6&subid=0> [10.09.09] 
34Danish Immigration Service: Organisational Diagram of the Danish Immigration Service 2008 
<http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/483419A3-F39B-4FCE-AC53-
BD87967F6233/0/organisationsdiagram_juni_08.pdf> [05.02.09] 
35NDI, 21.11.2008. Organisational Map <http://www.udi.no/templates/Page.aspx?id=5572> [20.02.09] 
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independent name, and also has its own website. Also in the question of the two offices’ 
professional output, the impartiality of the COI produced by Landinfo is stated in a 
Communication from the Parliament, dated 2003-2004,36 whereas there is no such 
corresponding formal legal statement for the Danish COI. Despite that in practice, both 
offices produce impartial, objective information that not only their directorates use, but 
also the appeals boards, NGOs, the police, and the press,37 the difference in formal versus 
informal status of the impartiality of COI is noted. Because of this impartiality, the COI 
agencies cannot be said to be directly involved in the verdict of an asylum application. 
Although they have great influence in providing the essential information needed for this 
process,38 they do not instruct on how the processors should use this information.39  
 
4.2.2. National Legislation 
Two sets of legislation are of great relevance to the COI agencies. These are the Aliens 
Acts and the Freedom of Information Acts. 
 
4.2.2.1. The National Aliens Acts 
Laws on immigration affect the COI offices indirectly by influencing how many and 
which asylum applications require COI. Because the need for COI predominantly 
involves applications of asylum, the other forms of immigration, e.g. family reunification 
and labour immigration, which are a substantial part of the Aliens Acts, are not 
elaborated on here. 
 
In Denmark, the political climate since the late 1990s has been to reduce the number of 
asylum seekers entering to the country (Kjær 2003: 254). In fact, the original Aliens Act 
of 1983 was at the time one of the most liberal in Europe, but the latest version of 2008 is 
                                                
36The Norwegian Ministry of Regional Government 2003-2004:  Communication from the Parliament nr. 
21.   Management relations in the field of immigration, Chapter 5.3.4 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/Rpub/STM/20032004/021/PDFS/STM200320040021000DDDPDFS.pdf> 
[03.05.09] 
37 Telephone correspondence with Jens Weise Olesen, country of origin expert consultant of the 
Documentation and Project Department of the DIS, May 9, 2009. 
38 See the example in the introduction. 
39Landinfo, 20.10.09. About Landinfo <http://landinfo.no/index.gan?id=6&subid=0> [20.10.09] 
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considered highly restrictive.40 Indeed, it was severely restricted in 2002 as a result of the 
Danish Liberal and Conservative government that passed the Bill No. L. 152/2001-2002, 
named the ‘Aliens Package’ (ibid: 255). This Bill abolished the de facto concept that 
defined the rights to asylum beyond those stated in the Geneva Convention.41 The de 
facto concept, stated in paragraph 7 (2) of the previous act, provided asylum seekers with 
residence on the count of “reasons similar to those of the Convention […] or other 
weighty reasons” (ibid: 257). It was replaced by the B-status, which removed the latter 
statement and in turn specifically included the rights stated in the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of protection from torture 
and the death penalty (ibid: 261). The Aliens Act as it stands today has seen a number of 
further restrictions on the rights of asylum, entry and residence. Although one cannot 
isolate this alteration as the only variable affecting asylum trends that also fluctuate 
according to external factors, it is still highly likely that the visibly declining number of 
asylum seeker applications as well as residence accorded on grounds of asylum are linked 
to this change in legislation (ibid: 267). Already in 2004, the number of asylum 
applications was down by one forth of what it had been in 2001, and the number of 
residencies granted asylum was 10%, compared to 53% in 2001.42 The overall trend has 
been for the numbers to continue to drop each year. In 2006, 1900 asylum applications 
were registered and 18% were granted residence.43  
 
The Norwegian Aliens Act has not known as dramatic changes as its Danish neighbour 
from its adoption in 1988 until the new version in 2008, with correspondingly no similar 
drop in application and granted residency numbers.44 Even though the number of asylum 
                                                
40E-mail and telephone correspondence with Morten Bo Laursen, Head of Information of the 
Communication and Director Stab, DIS, April 30, 2009. 
41
Changes of the Aliens Act since November 2001 (updated 1. Mai 2009): e-mail correspondence with 
Mikkel Bækgaard, the Information Department of the Danish Ministry of Integration, 30.04.09. 
42The Danish Ministry for Refugees, Foreigners and Integration. Numbers and Facts on Immigration 2004 
<http://www.nyidanmark.dk/resources.ashx/Resources/Statistik/tal_og_fakta/2004/talogfakta2004.pdf> p. 
10-12 [23.04.09] 
43DIS, March 2008. Numbers and Facts on Immigration 2007 
<http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/F496DBF0-6520-4666-BD73-
FFA22A74687A/0/tal_og_fakta_2007.pdf> [23.04.09] 
44The Norwegian Ministry of Work and Inclusion. Ot.prp. nr. 75 (2006-2007). The Aliens Act 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/aid/dok/regpubl/otprp/20062007/otprp-nr-75-2006-2007-
/1.html?id=474153> [25.04.09] 
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seekers is lower than they were in 2001-2002, this is the overall European trend.45 At the 
same time, a higher percentage of asylum seekers were granted residence status in later 
years.46 In 2006, 5300 asylum applications were filed, of which 57% were given 
residence.47 These developments reflect a consensus-driven immigration policy, where 
the main political parties, with the exception of the Progressive Party, have adopted a 
general policy of Norway needing to control immigration, but that it should be open to 
receiving asylum seekers and refugees (Christensen and Lægreid 2009: 5).  
 
The DIS had approximately 500 employees in 2001 whereas it currently employs 350 
civil servants.48 In accordance with the changes in legislation and numbers of asylum 
seekers, the Danish COI office was at its largest between 1998 and 2001, when it   
employed 15 people.49 It currently has 10 employees: the head of the department, six 
country experts, one administrator, one student, and one part-time intern.50 The NDI 
currently employs over 1000 civil servants51 as opposed to 520 in 2001.52 Following the 
steady development of asylum statistics, the Norwegian COI office has grown gradually 
in response to demands. Currently 22 people are employed in the office, including: the 
head of department, 18 country experts, and two administrators. This is an increase of 
five employees since 2005. 
 
 
                                                
45Statistics Norway, 17.05.05. Many Fleeing 
<http://www.ssb.no/vis/magasinet/norge_verden/art-2005-06-17-01.html> [23.04.09] 
46The Norwegian Ministry of Work and Inclusion. Ot.prp. nr. 75 (2006-2007). The Aliens Act, The 
Background for the Proposal <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/aid/dok/regpubl/otprp/20062007/otprp-
nr-75-2006-2007-/2.html?id=474173> [25.04.09] 
47The Norwegian Ministry of Work and Inclusion. Ot.prp. nr. 75 (2006-2007). The Aliens Act, The Picture 
on Migration 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/aid/dok/regpubl/otprp/20062007/otprp-nr-75-2006-2007-
/2/5.html?id=474182> [26.04.09] 
48E-mail and telephone correspondence with Morten Bo Laursen, Head of Information of the 
Communication and Director Stab, DIS, April 30, 2009. 
49Telephone correspondence with Jens Weise Olesen, country of origin expert consultant of the 
Documentation and Project Department of the DIS, May 9, 2009. 
50Yet an important difference is also that these ten employees also work on other project-based 
assignments, whereas the Norwegian Landinfo is solely responsible for producing COI. 
51NDI, 18.08.2009. Brief History of the NDI <http://www.udi.no/templates/Page.aspx?id=3488> [14.05.09] 
52E-mail correspondence with Per Chr. Jørgensen, consultant in the User Service Department of NDI, May 
8, 2009. 
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4.2.2.2. The Two Freedom of Information Acts 
Regarding freedom of information legislation, both COI agencies write reports and other 
documents that are primarily produced for the purpose of public administrative 
processing. Consequently, the question of whether or not these documents should be 
available to the public affects these two offices. In Norway and Denmark, these 
legislations have known few differences.53 The Danish Freedom of Information act is 
from 1985 and is currently under revision. Norway has a new Freedom of Information 
Act as of 2009, which is a revised version of the reference of 1970. What mainly 
characterises the Freedom of Information Acts of the two countries is a high degree of 
public insight, where the principle is that all public administrative documents should be 
publicly available unless specific circumstances and concerns call for exceptions.54 
However, on the subject of internal documents, the two Acts’ statements differ in how 
they define circumstances where documents can be classified.  
 
In the case of Denmark, paragraph 8.3. of the Act states that independent documents that 
are produced to provide guidance or clarity in the facts of a case for administrative 
processing should be publicly available.55 As a result of the Danish Act, all COI reports 
must without exception be publicly available. Yet concerns of confidentiality in regards 
to a person’s safety opens for the possibility for COI sources to stay anonymous in the 
reports. The new version of the Act will not lead to changes in the full openness of COI 
products.56 
 
                                                
53The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Police. Ot.prp. nr. 102 (2004-2005). The Freedom of Information 
Act 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/regpubl/otprp/20042005/Otprp-nr-102-2004-2005-
/2.html?id=400951> [20.05.09] 
54Lawdata, 09.01.09. LOV 1970-06-19 nr 69, The Freedom of Information Act 
<http://www.lovdata.no/oll/hl-19700619-069.html#1> [20.05.09]; Danish School of Media and Journalism, 
LOV nr 572 of 19/12/1985, The Freedom of Information Act 
<http://www.update.dk/cfje/Lovbasen.nsf/ID/LB00000597> [20.05.09] 
55ibid 
56Telephone correspondence with Jens Weise Olesen, country of origin expert consultant of the 
Documentation and Project Department of the DIS, May 9, 2009 
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In paragraph 5 of the Norwegian act of 1970, the exceptions to public access concern 
cases where documents could jeopardise administrative processing and in cases where the 
safety of individuals or organisations could be at stake. In the new Freedom of 
Information Act of 2009, the possibilities to classify documents are further restricted in 
paragraphs 11, 12 and 14.57 Nevertheless, the possibility to classify documents, such as 
COI reports, still exists. Debates have been ongoing about how to interpret the 
Norwegian legislation in the case of COI .58 Although one can observe that some 
information on the Landinfo website is withdrawn from the public while other 
information is available, there is generally less classified information in 2009 than in 
2005.59  
 
4. 3. Relations to the EU 
 
How do Norway and Denmark participate in the harmonisation process towards a 
Common European Asylum System?  
 
4.3.1. Decision-Making 
Denmark has been a EU member state since 1973 and Schengen member since 1996, 
entering into effect in 2001. Yet Denmark is known to be “EU sceptical” (Martens 2007: 
6). Since 1992, Denmark has had certain opt-outs in EU legislation.60 On the signing of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Danish opt-out of Justice and Home Affairs included the 
Title IV. This accords a specific status to Denmark, specified in Protocol no. 5 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. Although it follows the common European visa policy, in other 
areas related to the Schengen aquis, Denmark decides within a timeframe of six months 
whether or not it will implement a decision from the European Council. 
 
Norway has the right to participate in the implementation and further development of the 
                                                
57Lawdata, 15.10.2009. LOV 1970-06-19 nr 69 The Freedom of Information Act.  
<http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-20060519-016.html#1> [23.05.09] 
58Dagbladet, 25.10.05. New Openness on Country of Origin Information 
<http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2005/10/25/447403.html> [05.06.09] 
59Landinfo, 20.10.2009. Reports <http://landinfo.no/index.gan?id=168&subid=0> [20.01.09] 
60The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22.11.2006. The Danish Opt-Outs 
<www.um.dk/en/menu/EU/TheDanishOptouts> [27-07-08] 
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Schengen aquis. Through the European Economic Area agreement, Norway participates 
in the Mixed Committee together with Iceland, the EU member states and the European 
Commission. When the member states vote in the European Council on new rules in 
regards to Schengen, Norway takes its independent decision. If Norway does not concede 
to an agreement, the Mixed Committee will discuss options during a period of ninety 
days. If there is not a consensus, the agreement ceases after three months. If Norway 
wishes to offer a proposal to the European Council, this must be done by the Commission 
or through another member state.61  
 
4.3.2. Approaching Legislation 
Norway and Denmark have both made similar alterations to their legislation in 
accordance with the development of the EU on its legislation on asylum. They both made 
the necessary alterations after the Schengen agreement came into force in 2001, together 
with the Dublin Convention. Later adjustments included the common visa policy and the 
joint recognition of dismissal of an asylum application made in another Schengen 
country. The two countries also ratified the Dublin !! Regulation in 2005, along with the 
Eurodac fingerprint register.  
 
Although the two countries have followed similar developments when it comes to 
adapting to these steps of EU legislation, the differences in the national Aliens Acts still 
result in different relations to the EU on this matter. Norway is seen to have a standard 
policy, yet as previously pointed out, Denmark’s Aliens Act is seen controversial. This is 
clearly illustrated by the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights that have 
contradicted the Danish policy of asylum and family reunification, last seen in the 
Metock-verdict of July 2008.62 
 
One of the main reasons for the new Norwegian Freedom of Information Act of 2009 was 
                                                
61The European Portal. Norway’s Cooperation with the EU on Justice and Domestic Affairs 
<www.regjeringen.no/nb/sub/europapotalen/eu/Norges-samarbeid-med-EU-pa-justis--og-
innenriksomradet.html?id=450611> [25-07-08] 
62The Danish Ministry for Refugees, Foreigners and Integration, 19.08.08. Note on the Legal Evaluation of 
the Verdict on the Metock case 
<http://multimedia.jp.dk/archive/00119/juridisk_notat_om_m_119748a.pdf> [25.08.08] 
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to meet criteria from the EU. Dating back to the Treaty of Amsterdam, citizens' right of 
access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents were stated in 
Article 255, and a Regulation on public access to these documents (Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001) was adopted.63 The following Recommendation, Rec (2002) 2, suggested 
minimum standards for public access to information for the member states.64 Still, the 
document “Common EU guidelines for Processing COI” defines circumstances where 
COI should be classified. Accordingly, even though Norwegian and EU legislation both 
allow for high degree of insight, the possibility for classifying COI reports remains in 
Norway as is also suggested by the EU. Therefore, Norway’s legislation on public insight 
is compatible with that of the EU in the case of public access to COI. The Danish 
Freedom of Information Act is currently under revision, and one reason for this is to 
further approach EU legislation. However, in the case of COI, the Danish reports all 
remain publicly accessible and are therefore less compatible with what the EU guidelines 
propose.  
 
4.3.3. The COI Agencies Participate 
In the field of COI, Denmark and Norway both participate regularly at the Eurasil 
meetings. The country experts are also involved in the use of the ECS Database and have 
experience from travelling on joint FFMs. Denmark participated in the realisation of the 
“Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI” document.65 Norway provided input to the 
document in the form of interviews of staff.66 A more in-depth account of how the civil 
servants participate in the five forms of cooperation of the harmonisation process was 
revealed in the interviews of which the results will follow in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                
63Europa, 28.10.2008. Access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents 
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l14546.htm> [24.08.08] 
64The Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police. Ot.prp. nr. 102 (2004-2005) Freedom of Information 
Act 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/jd/dok/regpubl/otprp/20042005/Otprp-nr-102-2004-2005-
/2/6.html?id=400960> [24.08.08] 
65European Commission, April 2008. Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI 
<http://www.bfm.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/migration/laenderinformationen/herkunftslaenderinformation
en.Par.0003.File.tmp/COI_Leitlinien-e.pdf> [16.04.09] 
66ibid: 4 
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4.4. Summary 
 
From the overview of the European harmonisation process of asylum policy generally, 
and COI cooperation specifically, one can conclude on its importance in the overall 
ambitions of the EU. The five forms of COI cooperation in the EU speak of a detailed 
harmonisation process of COI in Europe, wherein the Norwegian and Danish COI 
agencies are taking part. An overview of the domestic settings of the two offices revealed 
some key differences, one of which was that the Danish and Norwegian political climates 
have differed in regards to immigration in the last two decades. The Danish case has lead 
to an Aliens Act that is considered restrictive in a European context, with an incline in 
numbers of asylum seekers as consequence. In Norway, the approach on immigration has 
not known such restrictive measures. The result of this difference in policy is that the 
NDI currently employs almost three times as many civil servants as the DIS, and that the 
Norwegian Landinfo is also roughly three times the size of The Documentation and 
Project Department of the DIS. Furthermore, the differences in placement of the COI 
agencies in their organisational structure, their respective names, websites, and in what 
form the impartiality of their information is specified, all suggest that the Norwegian COI 
agency enjoys more independence from its directorate than does its Danish counterpart. 
Furthermore, the comparison on the Freedom of Information Acts of Norway and 
Denmark revealed another key difference: although both countries are showing signs of 
approaching EU legislation on this point, the Norwegian Act, in line with the 
recommendations from the EU, still opens for the possibility for COI reports to be 
classified, whereas Danish legislation has ruled out this option.  
 
After this overview of both the European and domestic ‘worlds’ to which the agencies 
belong, the collected data from COI reports and from interviews with COI experts can be 
presented while baring this context in mind. 
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CHAPTER 5. DATA: THE FACT-FINDING MISSION REPORTS AND THE CIVIL 
SERVANTS 
 
 
In this chapter, two types of data will be presented and compared. Firstly, following a 
brief overview of the products of the two offices in the last two years, three pairs of FFM 
reports will be compared with the aim of answering the first part of the research question: 
What are the differences in FFM reports between the Norwegian and Danish COI 
agencies? The documents have been selected for the purpose of comparison and were 
thereby chosen out of three criteria, as specified in chapter two: they are FFM reports; 
they focus on the same country of origin; and they are written the same year after a 
delegation travelled on a FFM. As was also explained previously, the comparisons will 
be separated into two main parts: the information sources consulted; and the structure and 
content of the reports. Secondly, this comparison is placed into the context of the 
Common European Asylum System, to answer the second part of the research question of 
this thesis: What do these differences imply in the context of the EU’s harmonisation 
process of COI? Thirdly, the data collected from the qualitative interviews will be 
presented by comparing the answers from the civil servants in the two offices. This 
presentation is meant to prepare the data for the analysis of the following chapter by 
enabling the researcher to identify key similarities and differences between the 
Norwegian and Danish COI offices.  
 
5.1. Comparing the Reports from the Norwegian and Danish COI Agencies 
 
5.1.1. Publications in 2007 and 2008 
The website of the Norwegian office Landinfo67 shows 41 reports dated 2007, most of 
which are brief notes, between 4 and 10 pages, on specific topics within countries of 
origin. These could be for example the situation of HIV/AIDS, TB and Diabetes in 
Burundi, or the human rights situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A few of 
                                                
67Landinfo, 20.10.2009. Reports <http://landinfo.no/index.gan?id=168&subid=0> [20.10.09] 
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the reports are specified as FFM reports. These vary in size, ranging from 25 to 40 pages. 
57 documents are available from 2008, also largely topic notes. There has been a clear 
development from writing mostly FFM reports towards topic notes. The Danish office 
produces mainly FFM reports, and has written approximately 80 such reports since they 
started in 1994. 7 FFM reports in 2007 and 4 in 2008 are available from the website.68 
These are generally 50 pages long. 
 
5.1.2. The FFM Reports on Somalia, 200769 
Both these reports are FFM reports; they are the product of a trip that the COI experts 
from both the Norwegian and Danish agencies made in 2007. Because travelling into 
Somalia was considered impossible for safety reasons at the time of the trip, the process 
of collecting information was based in Nairobi. The Norwegian delegation was in Nairobi 
in the period 21-29 March 2007. The Danish delegation was there from the 14 to 27 
March 2007. As the experts were there at the same time, this makes the reports all the 
more comparable.  
 
5.1.2.1. References 
Several differences can be observed between the two reports in regards to the references 
to the sources: seven primary sources from personal meetings are the same, out of 41 (not 
counting the unnamed sources), whereof 20 are from the Norwegian report and 21 from 
the Danish one. Three written secondary sources are the same, out of 31 whereof 20 are 
from the Norwegian report, 11 from the Danish one. The Norwegian report has many 
links to press and media references they have used. The Danish report does not have 
these specifications. Both reports refer to international organizations and Somali 
organizations that are kept anonymous; the Norwegian report refers to three, the Danish 
to six.  
                                                
68DIS. Search in Publications <http://www.nyidanmark.dk/da-
dk/publikationer/SearchPublications.htm?SearchType=publications&SubType=Fact-finding%20rapport> 
[19.01.09] 
69Landinfo. November 2007. Security and Human Rights Conditions in Southern Somalia 
<http://landinfo.no/asset/648/1/648_1.pdf> [04.06.08]; DIS; Danish Refugee Council, March 2007. Human 
Rights and Security in Central and Southern Somalia 
<http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/F382C881-5A67-4605-845F-
953B98E01355/0/somaliarapport_humanrights.pdf> [12.06.08] 
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5.1.2.2. Content 
The reports are organised differently. The first section of both reports is about the 
security situation in southern and central Somalia. However, whereas the Norwegian 
report is organised by region and goes with detail through each one separately and notes 
differences between them, the Danish has a more general approach by theme.  
 
The following section is on the National Reconciliation Conference in the Danish report. 
This conference is only briefly mentioned in the Norwegian report. The Danish report 
also goes more into detail about the current conflict between the Union of Islamic Courts 
and the Transitional Federal Government in this section. 
 
Many topics that follow are mentioned in both reports: the human rights situation and the 
security for those monitoring these rights; the situation for minority populations and for 
internally displaced persons; the subject of politically motivated persecutions with 
emphasis on the Union of Islamic Courts members as well as the situation for those 
supporting the Transitional Federal Government. The topic of clan protection is also 
mentioned in both reports. The Danish document supplements this topic by also bringing 
up the topic of cross-clan marriages. This is not mentioned in the Norwegian report. In 
fact, other noteworthy differences include:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
• Both reports have a section on the situation specifically for women, with 
emphasis on female genital mutilation and rape victims, yet a difference in 
opinion from sources is expressed. The Norwegian report refers to a source that 
says there is positive progress in the movement against female genital mutilation, 
whereas in the Danish report, the informant is clearly negative, stating that 
nothing has been achieved in the last 10 years. In the Norwegian report there is 
also information on the security situation for non-female genital mutilation 
activists.  
• On the topic of children, the phenomenon of forced recruitment of children and 
child soldiers is brought up in both reports, yet the Danish report has a section that 
describes the situation for orphans and also mentions the subject of re-education 
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trips to Somalia of children living abroad. Neither of these two issues is 
mentioned in the Norwegian report.  
• Concerning minority groups, the Danish report has a section on HIV/AIDS 
victims, as well as a section about the situation for homosexuals in the country. 
Also the subject of religious conversion and the situation for Christians is 
mentioned. None of these topics are mentioned in the Norwegian report. The 
Danish report also describes the situation for persons returning from Europe as 
well as Ethiopia. This is also not discussed in the Norwegian report.  
• Other topics mentioned in the Norwegian report that do not figure in the Danish 
one are property seizures and the legal systems/courts in the country.  
 
5.1.3. The FFM Reports on Nigeria, 200670 
The FFM reports on Nigeria focus on human trafficking. Landinfo travelled to the 
regions of Abuja, Lagos, and Benin City in the period 12 to 26 March 2006. The Danish 
delegation travelled to Lagos and Abuja and stayed from the 12 to 21 December 2006. 
The Norwegian office also wrote a more general FFM report after the trip. The Danish 
office wrote another FFM report on the subject of prison conditions in Nigeria from their 
trip. Both offices had written FFM reports on Nigeria in 2004, the Danish one being a 
product of collaboration between the British Home Office and the DIS. In the Norwegian 
report, it is stated that the decision to make the report public was taken previous to the 
trip and that all the sources were informed of this fact. 
 
5.1.3.1. References 
Also between these two reports, the variety in sources is significant. Six out of 35 
primary sources are the same, the Norwegian office referring to 28 and the Danish office 
to 15. The Norwegian report refers to 15 written sources and quotes several passages of 
articles inside the report itself. The Danish report refers to no such secondary sources.  
All sources in both reports are referred to by full name. 
                                                
70Landinfo, 12-26.03.2006. Trafficking in Women – Fact-finding Trip to Nigeria (Abuja, Lagos and Benin 
City) <http://landinfo.no/asset/224/1/224_1.pdf> [23.07.08]; DIS, 12-21.12.2006. Trafficking in Nigeria. 
Report from Fact-Finding Mission to Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria 
<http://www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/0090EF1C-C160-4033-A008-
5D29D89F227F/0/MenneskehandeltraffickingiNigeria44.pdf> [20.07.08] 
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5.1.3.2. Content 
Both reports give much importance to the National Agency for the Prohibition of 
Trafficking in Persons and Other Matters (NAPTIP), established in 2003 for the purpose 
of enforcing the national ‘Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and 
Administration Act 2003’. Much of the content of both reports are based on the 
information given to the delegations from NAPTIP.  
 
Several topics are discussed in both reports. Focus is given to where and what socio-
economic background the victims come from, the Norwegian report also stressing the 
collapse of the traditional value system in the poor regions. Both reports state the same 
opinion from their informants that currently, most victims decide themselves to contact 
traffickers to leave Nigeria, and know that they will work as prostitutes, but that they 
often do not realise the extent of control that others will have over them. Both reports 
describe how the trafficking usually takes place from initial recruitment in Nigeria to the 
situation in Europe and finally return and reintegration. Some key concepts here are: ‘ju-
ju,’ or spiritual oaths that are taken between the victim and the trafficker; the ‘Italios’ that 
are former trafficked victims who have returned after having success in Europe; and the 
‘madams’, often former prostitutes who now run organised prostitution businesses. They 
also both emphasise what NAPTIP’s main responsibilities are and how they work.  
 
Some of the main differences between the two reports are the following:  
• There is a detailed description in the Danish report of the criteria for defining 
someone as a victim of trafficking, both from the United Nations and NAPTIP. 
The Norwegian report offers no such definition. 
• The Danish report goes into detail on risks of abuse for the victims, by the 
traffickers, private persons, Nigerian authorities and family, and refers to 
NAPTIP’s opinion that fear of abuse from these persons is unfounded. The 
Norwegian report does not develop this subject specifically, but does mention one 
informant who expressed concern for the safety of victims also upon return to 
Nigeria from her knowledge of threats from agents and family. 
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• The Norwegian report mentions specifically the health situation of victims, of 
whom a majority, according to one informant, has HIV/AIDS. The Danish report 
does not elaborate on this point, yet both reports discuss the psychological state of 
the victims. 
• The Norwegian report has a section on children that focuses on the extent of local 
and regional problems of child trafficking. This subject is not described in detail 
in the Danish report. 
• The Danish report states that the problem of victims of trafficking and that of 
asylum seekers are linked because the agents encourage the women to seek 
asylum if arrested, but the Norwegian report suggests that there is little coherence 
between those who are trafficked and those who seek asylum.  
 
5.1.4. The FFM Reports on Iraq, 200371 
The Norwegian report is the result of a joint Norwegian and Swedish FFM to northern 
Iraq, Kurdistan, but the FFM report in hand is written by Landinfo. The trip took place 
from the 31 August to 10 September 2003, during which the delegation travelled to six 
cities in Kurdistan where they held 33 meetings in total, as well as to Damascus and 
Amman. The Danish report is the result of a joint Danish and British FFM to Iraq and the 
written report is the product of both agencies. The delegation travelled to Damascus, 
Amman and Geneva from the 1 to 13 July and on the 23 July 2003. There is a difference 
in the purpose of the reports, the Norwegian one focusing solely on Kurdistan while the 
other looks at the whole country. Yet the Danish-British report has an under-category of 
each chapter dedicated specifically to the Kurdistan region. The comparison of the two 
reports will be focused on this particular region.  
 
 
 
                                                
71Landinfo, 27.08.2003-11.09.2003. Report from a Fact-Finding Mission to Northern Iraq. Syria and 
Jordan <http://landinfo.no/index.gan?id=168&subid=0> press link: Report from fact-finding mission, Iraq 
2003 (English) [17.08.08]  
British Home Office; DIS. 1-13-07-03; 23.07.03. Joint British-Danish Fact Finding Mission to Damascus, 
Amman and Geneva on Conditions in Iraq 
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports.html#countries>; press link: Archive Publications; 
Iraq, COI Fact Finding Mission July 2003 [17.08.08] 
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5.1.4.1. References 
In a strict sense, 3 sources out of 46 are the same, including 7 anonymous sources in the 
Danish-British report. The Norwegian report has no anonymous sources and refers to a 
total of 29 sources, whereof 26 are from the Kurdistan region. The Danish-British report 
has a total of 21 sources. A closer look reveals that two of the same organisations have 
been consulted, only at a different location.  
 
5.1.4.2. Content 
The contents of the two reports have some obvious differences due to the differences in 
geographical focus, yet there are similarities in the overall topics and structure of the 
reports. The Danish-British report has a first chapter on the current political situation in 
Iraq that the Norwegian report does not have, but further on the two reports follow the 
same sequence in chapters: the security situation; the humanitarian situation; human 
rights - specific groups; and finally return/repatriation. However, within these topics one 
can observe several differences: 
• The security situation: The reports mention different attacks that have occurred 
after the war. The Danish-British report mentions an attack on a International 
Organization of Migration office, on a City Council, and police station. The 
Norwegian report mentions an attack on a residential area where Americans lived. 
Ethnic tension between Arabs and Kurds as a result of de-Arabisation of the 
region is also mentioned in both reports. However, the Danish-British report 
states that the tension is getting worse, whereas the Norwegian report does not 
express this tendency.  
• The humanitarian situation: In the joint Danish-British report, the section about 
the northern region is brief on this topic, stating that there is access to food, water, 
and healthcare. The Norwegian equivalent to this chapter focuses on the health 
situation and goes into great detail concerning hospitals, medical equipment, 
training, and access to treatment in Kurdistan and abroad. The Norwegian report 
mentions that the only institution for mental illness in Iraq was in Baghdad, but 
the Danish-British report declares that there were no institutions treating mental 
illness at the time. 
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• The human rights situation – specific groups: Only the Norwegian report presents 
the conditions for women in prison. Both reports present sections on ethnic and 
religious minorities, as well as discussing the de-Arabisation process in the north 
and the situation for political oppositions such as the Iraqi Communist Party. Yet 
only the Danish-British report describes in detail the situation for Ba’ath party 
members and supporters with their families.  
• Return/repatriation: The Norwegian report states that the Kurdish leadership 
wants Kurds to return, and mentions that a source insists that the Kurds are 
pushing to go home on their own, estimating that 300 Kurds return daily. The 
Danish-British report, however, refers to a source explaining that the Kurds 
consider it too soon to return to the area. The Danish-British report states that the 
return must be matched with where the individuals came from originally, that 
according to a source, internal relocation is not possible. This is not mentioned in 
the Norwegian report. The latter, however, has a specific section concerning the 
return of unaccompanied minors, a subject that is not mentioned in the Danish-
British report.  
 
5.1.5. Summary 
The comparison of these three pairs of reports can serve as an illustration on how 
different the COI documents from the two national COI agencies are to date. From the 
overview presented above, one finds that clear similarities occur, especially in some main 
topics that are discussed. However, many differences were identified. It was a great 
challenge to find reports that were comparable following the criteria of ‘same country of 
origin, same year’. This speaks of a high variety in production of COI between the two 
agencies. One striking difference was the low number of common information sources, 
such as for Somalia, where 7 out of 41 sources were the same. Furthermore, some key 
differences in perspectives on specific topics were found. In the case of Somalia, one 
difference was that the Norwegian informant on the subject of female genital mutilation 
stated that progress had taken place concerning the risks for a woman to be subjected to 
this act, whereas the informant consulted by the Danish delegation was of the opinion 
that no progress had been made. On the subject of trafficking in Nigeria, an informant in 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
51 
the Danish report stated that the risks of abuse to victims of trafficking by their agents or 
families was unfounded, whereas an informant in the Norwegian report was of a different 
view. Finally, in the Iraq/Kurdistan reports, an example worth mentioning was that the 
Danish report described the ethnic tension between Kurds and Arabs as worsening, 
whereas this tendency was not described in the Norwegian report. In general, the 
comparison of the three sets of reports, from 2003, 2006 and 2007, does not suggest a 
clear chronological development towards more or less diversity, and the constellations of 
the FFM delegations, both from different national institutions and as cooperation with 
foreign COI agencies does not suggest any set pattern. 
 
5. 2. Implications of the Differences in FFM Reports  
 
In the previous chapter, the steps of the development towards Common European 
Asylum System were described, with emphasis on the harmonisation process of COI. 
Within this context, the Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive 
were described, and it was highlighted that Article 4 of the Qualification Directive states 
that:“[…] the assessment of an application for international protection should take into 
account all relevant facts as they relate to the Country of Origin”.
72 Furthermore, Article 
7 of the Asylum Procedures Directive reads: “[…] precise and up to date information is 
made available to personnel responsible for examining applications and taking 
decisions”.
73 These goals are expressed as standards that should be attained throughout 
the EU and Schengen area, and are the driving force behind the several forms of COI 
cooperation in the EU.  
 
Considering the challenge of finding comparable reports and the key differences that 
have been identified by comparing the three sets of FFM reports above, it is clear that, in 
practice, COI reports differ between the two agencies. The extent of variation of 
information sources that have been consulted does not necessarily affect the 
                                                
72European Commission, 17.2.2006. New Structures, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision 
Making in the Common European Asylum System, Annexes 
<www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/docs/sec_2006_189_en.pdf> p. 9 [consulted 
26.07.08]  
73 ibid 
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harmonisation process negatively. A range of sources could allow for the weighing of 
their quality. Yet the comparison shows that the opinions of these sources have, at times, 
revealed themselves to be contradictory between the two reports, e.g. the difference of 
opinion concerning the risks of abuse for Nigerian victims of trafficking. Similarly, given 
that the topics of the reports are related to the asylum applications filed at the domestic 
level, the variation of topics that are raised does not directly oppose harmonisation. 
However, the challenge lies in whether topics are left out that could have provided 
additional information, which would set the application in a different light. A description 
of the security situation of a specific region in Somalia as opposed to a thematic overview 
of the country; or a detailed description on a certain minority in the country, could be an 
illustration of the latter. Such challenges prove that it is legitimate to ask whether the 
goals set by the EU as expressed in the articles 4 and 7 above have currently been met. 
The Qualification Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive wish to set minimum 
standards for qualifying as a refugee or someone otherwise in need of international 
protection, as well as standard minimum procedures that grant this status. As such, the 
results of this comparison of COI products show that it is conceivable that a person in 
need of protection could qualify in one country and not in the other. The asylum 
application could be processed differently, depending on the COI that is available to the 
processor at a given moment. The comparison of the three sets of reports above may 
serve as an illustration to show that the EU’s harmonisation process of COI has, in 
practice, not as of yet achieved its goal to achieve fully harmonised COI in the EU and 
Schengen area.  
 
Is the COI of the Norwegian and Danish COI agencies likely to become more harmonised 
as the result of further cooperation as the EU harmonisation process of COI continues? 
The following data from the interviews with civil servants from the two agencies will 
provide the basis for answering the final part of the research question of this thesis.  
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5.3. Comparing the Interviews from the Norwegian and Danish COI Agencies 
 
The interviews will be summarised and compared by following the main structure of the 
interviews: the degree of freedom of decision-making; comments on the comparison of 
the reports; and views on COI cooperation within the EU/Schengen area. As previously 
mentioned, seven civil servants were interviewed in total, among them five country 
experts, one expert on the ECS Database cooperation, and one head of office. The 
respondents from the Norwegian office are listed as informant A through D. The Danish 
respondents are listed as informant E, F and G.  
 
5.3.1. Freedom Versus Regulations: Who Makes the Decisions? 
The interviewees were asked to describe how the FFMs take place. The situation in both 
offices was that the asylum departments of the two directorates as well as the two appeals 
boards informed them of their needs for new COI. Yet the degree of freedom the experts 
had to make decisions in the process seemed to vary between and within the agencies. 
Informant A felt that he/she had a high degree of freedom to choose which subjects to 
investigate and include in a report, to choose when would be the best time to go on a 
FFM, and to choose which sources to interview. Informant C felt that the issues that were 
to be investigated on a FFM were quite clearly specified by their users and that there was 
some, but not much, flexibility. Informant B agreed that there were precise requests from 
their users, but that they were the ones taking final decisions on the topics to be 
investigated because they were the ones with the overview of what information already 
exists and what is worth looking into for a current update. He/she explained that: “we 
have ‘need to know’ and we have ‘nice to know’. We’re the ones who make sure it’s all 
‘need to know’.” They also made the final decisions regarding when to travel and which 
sources to interview. 
 
Informant B stated that the way this takes place in Denmark is far more formal. 
“Everything is in written form and all parties must officially approve of the document. 
Here we don’t need approval from the top, and I’ve asked myself why they have to have 
such a formal procedure in Denmark”, he/she added. Informants E and F stated that they 
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receive direct instructions from the DIS and the RAB on which information they seek. 
The DIS, the RAB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Commissioner of Police, 
and sometimes the Danish Refugee Council work together with the COI office to write a 
‘kommisorium’. This is a document stating all the decisions made prior to the FFM 
regarding what information they need. Informant E added that once these decisions were 
made, there is no room to improvise, although the Danish COI agency did, as was the 
case in the Norwegian agency, decide how to organise the trip and which sources to 
interview. Informant F explained that this procedure had the positive advantage of 
legitimising the final product. “When everyone has been involved and has agreed, there 
are no discussions later.” 
 
As for the degree of freedom to decide whether the reports were to be available to the 
public or not, the informants in both offices replied that they follow their national 
legislation on freedom of information. The interviewees from the Norwegian office 
explained that there are often discussions about how open a report should be considering 
the particular circumstances, but that these discussions always refer to the interpretation 
of the Norwegian Freedom of Information Act. The informants from the Danish office 
explained that all their reports must without exception be publicly available, following 
the Danish Freedom of Information Act. Informant E explained that they are allowed to 
keep some sources anonymous for reasons of protection, but stressed that they try to 
avoid this as much as possible. 
 
The actual writing of the reports was solely the responsibility of the country experts. Yet 
informant F from the Danish office stated that the format and the table of content of the 
report, e.g. not only the content but also the structure and sequence of topics of the report 
were decided in the ‘kommisorium’. He/she described the work as “very specific”. 
 
5.3.2. Discussing FFM Reports 
When asked about the differences in the reports between the Norwegian and the Danish 
agencies, informant A pointed out that some of these differences could be due to personal 
prioritisation and writing style. Even within the Norwegian office, there were discussions 
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on how to write. Informant B explained that the agency has changed towards writing less 
FFM reports and more topic notes. Topic notes were more specifically to the point on the 
issue concerning an asylum application and easier to constantly update when it was not in 
the format of a general report that was dated according to a specific trip.  
 
On the subject of sources, the informants explained that the different sources that have 
been used in the Norwegian and Danish reports could be due to the contact network that 
each embassy has. Many of the sources they use have been introduced to the COI experts 
by their embassy, and that these may then vary depending on which embassy is involved. 
Both informant B and E stressed that a network of sources is also the result of continuous 
and regular contact between them and their sources, some of which have existed for a 
long time. Informant A mentioned that various country experts might prioritise different 
types of sources. He/she felt it was important to use many written sources from historical 
and anthropological studies to place the report in its proper context. Furthermore, it was 
considered a high priority to meet with the local press in the country. He/she expressed 
that there was little point in interviewing the human rights organisations and diplomats 
that “wear the same glasses as we do”. Rather, the goal was to receive information from 
another perspective that could possibly correct the information they already possess. 
Informant B mentioned that one must take into consideration that every source has its 
own motives behind the information they are giving, and that it was essential to ask 
oneself: “who are they; who do they represent; what do they want; and how well do we 
know them?” Informant B stressed the importance of crosschecking with several sources, 
as did informant F, stating that you could get a very different feeling of a situation 
depending on which source you talked to. It was also stressed by informants A and E that 
there was great value in having been to the location in person and talked to sources 
directly. Because this value is recognised in both Norway and Denmark, they are two of 
the COI agencies that travel the most on FFMs amongst the EU and Schengen states. 
 
On the question of content, all informants made it clear that the issues raised in each 
report directly reflect the current asylum flows they have and the questions related to 
these applications. When asked whether political climate or media focus had influence on 
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what they wrote about, the informants from both agencies stated that there was no such 
direct influence. The aim was for the COI to be as objective as possible, uninfluenced by 
political opinions or topics raised by the press. However, it was mentioned by informant 
E that, indirectly, substantial political changes such as the changes to the Aliens Act in 
Denmark has drastically reduced the total number of asylum seekers, and therefore also 
the needs of COI. As for their own abilities to be impartial and well suitable for making 
the appropriate selection of material, the interviewees pointed out that the level of 
education of all the COI experts was high, with minimum a master degree. They also 
stressed that the many years of work experience with the country of origin and its region 
made them suited to evaluate which information is the most impartial and trustworthy. 
The one informant who was newly employed pointed out that she/he received a high level 
of training from the experienced COI consultants.  
 
5.3.3. How do We Cooperate? 
Informants from both offices explained that certain forms of information exchange have 
existed for a long time, such as bilateral exchange between the Nordic countries. Yet, as 
noted while comparing the reports, significant differences remain to date. When asked 
about how they relate to the diverse forms of cooperation that have now been established 
at the EU level, answers seemed to vary considerably depending on which specific type 
of cooperation in question.  
 
5.3.3.1. Eurasil Meetings 
Regarding the Eurasil meetings, the interviewees from both offices argued that they were 
generally considered to be useful, but not because the experts actually learned something 
new during the meetings. All the respondents except for informant C stated that they had 
not yet had the experience of receiving new information on their respective country of 
origin during the meetings. On the contrary, the general perspective was that other EU 
member states, especially the new members, were learning from their expertise during 
these meetings.  
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The reason why the respondents felt it was useful to participate was because the meetings 
provided opportunities for networking between experts. All the respondents stressed that 
it was rewarding to meet other country experts. Informant A mentioned that it made a big 
difference to “have a face”, so that you remember the person and their specific expertise. 
It was then easier to keep contact with that particular person or office when seeking 
information. The foreign office could provide them with useful information, and they, in 
return, could supply the others with the expertise they had. According to informants A 
and B, the criteria for such a relationship was that the foreign experts had the same higher 
education level, had long experience with COI work, and were specialised or had 
embassies in regions/countries where they had none. Informant B stated this opinion 
clearly: “if someone comes up to me and says: “I’ve worked with this country for a year, 
so I know everything now”, my answer is: no you don’t!” 
 
Another reason mentioned as a positive effect of participating at the meetings was 
Norway’s reputation in the EU. Informant D explained that because Norway has high 
competence in the field of COI, this gives the country a good image. The expertise they 
possess is valued: “they listen to us even though we are such a small country in the EU 
context”, he/she explained. Informants A and E mentioned that a country is heard and is 
asked to give presentations on account of acknowledged expertise, not according to its 
importance and role in the EU. According to informants A, B and E, the other European 
countries recognise that they have experience from a long history of COI work, as well as 
having done and currently going on many FFMs. The argument of “having actually been 
there and talked to the source”, is highly regarded. Informant G also mentioned that the 
Danish agency participates on COI meetings and workshops just as the other EU member 
states regardless of the Danish opt-outs. However, as a consequence of their opt-outs of 
Title IV, they do not receive financing from ARGO in all cooperation as the others do. 
 
Informant C added that not only did participation in the EU in areas where they have 
expertise give Norway a good reputation in the EU; it was also beneficial to Norway 
because it legitimises their own policy. “There is much to be gained from receiving 
confirmation from the EU that our standards are good because it adds to Norway’s 
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confidence in domestic policy”, he/she explained. Informant A also expressed this view, 
but with his/her own case as an example: “it is good to come home with the confirmation 
that you know everything there is to know about your country of origin”. Informant B 
warned about the danger of isolation from the EU: “even though you don’t necessarily 
learn anything new, you need to keep your eyes and ears open, and take care never to 
stand on the outside of goings-on”.  
 
Some interviewees had worked in the COI offices for many years and some were 
relatively new. Accordingly, some had been to numerous Eurasil meetings and two had 
only been to a few. The officials were asked to comment on several questions that 
revolved around whether participating at Eurasil meetings had made them more EU-
orientated. All the informants except one answered that it had not. The informants 
perceived of themselves as country representatives when participating at EU meetings. It 
was also the general opinion that although there was mention of the importance of 
working towards common EU harmonisation, there was little emphasis on promoting the 
concept of a common EU community during the Eurasil meetings. The civil servants 
were categorised according to their nationality and referred to as such. Focus was on 
practical exchange of information between the member countries, not on playing down 
their differences in favour of a feeling of a shared community. However, informant A 
remembered that Norway’s nametags were of a different colour and design than those of 
EU member states (!), and that this was a statement to imply that they are outsiders. One 
informant answered that she/he often left a meeting feeling inspired to work towards 
forming a greater community in Europe, yet mentioned that: “after a while the general 
view in the office that it takes time away from other work sinks in again and the initial 
enthusiasm wears off”.  
 
5.3.3.2. Regular Joint FFMs? 
When asked about their opinion regarding the suggestions from the EU for COI agencies 
to travel together on joint FFMs, the informants from both offices expressed a dual view 
on the matter. Although they could see benefits in information sharing, several 
informants stressed that there were many issues that needed to be dealt with and clarified 
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if such a trip should be successful. Such issues were mostly concerns on a practical level, 
where travelling together would mean a greater need for coordination, bureaucracy, and 
time. One needed to be absolutely sure all parties agreed on all methods applied, topics 
discussed, purpose of the report (for public or classified use), means of transportation, 
and security measures. Informant E explained that it would be of no use for a delegation 
that must publish all information publicly (such as Denmark) to travel with a group that 
keeps all or most information classified. The methods in such a case would be 
incompatible, and much confusion could arise for the sources. Informants B and C were 
of the opinion that they could lose valuable information if travelling with a delegation 
that needed to make all information public. It was their opinion that several sources 
would withhold information or refuse to talk to them at all if the reports would be entirely 
open to the public. Informants from both agencies preferred to travel incognito with local 
taxis and without visible statements of being an official delegation, and voiced concern 
that too many travelling together could intimidate the sources to the point where they 
would not feel at ease with sharing information.  
 
5.3.3.2. Guidelines 
When asked about the document “Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI”74, all the 
country experts thought it was a good document, but stressed that such documents were 
not rules that had to be followed. Rather, they were free to interpret and relate to the 
proposed standards as they wished. Informant A summed up the situation as follows: “we 
include what we feel makes sense from EU cooperation, but we are in no way locked in 
to any of the standards they set on COI matters.” The particular position that Norway has, 
by not being a EU member state, was given as the explanation to this freedom. However, 
informant G from the Danish agency explained that even though they had participated in 
the process of making the guidelines, these were not rules that had to be followed. 
Accordingly, the two offices relate to the document in a similar fashion.  
 
                                                
74European Commission, April 2008. Common EU Guidelines for Processing COI 
<http://www.bfm.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/migration/laenderinformationen/herkunftslaenderinformation
en.Par.0003.File.tmp/COI_Leitlinien-e.pdf> [16.09.08] 
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Although they could relate to the document as each of them saw fit, the overall tendency 
was to consider it of minor importance to them. One reason given for according the 
document little attention was that there did not seem to be much difference in how they 
work and how the joint EU guidelines announce that the COI processing ought to occur. 
Yet it seems that the main reason stated for not giving the document much attention was 
that they had to prioritise working efficiently with the time they had in order to provide 
their respective immigration directorates and national appeals boards with requested 
information. They had to stick to their ways of working and could not spend time using 
this or other documents as checklists to see if everything they did corresponded to the 
criteria, methods and definitions proposed as standards from the EU.  
 
When asked specifically about the second part of the document that suggests how to 
separate public and classified COI, all the informants pointed out that this part of the 
document is not relevant to them because they must follow their national legislation on 
this matter. In both agencies, the interviewees expressed that they were in favour of their 
legislation. The Danish civil servants were of the opinion that full public access to 
information was the best solution for everyone, and informant E stressed that all COI 
offices in the EU should make COI available to the public. The Norwegian civil servants 
preferred their variety, stating that as much information as possible should be publicly 
available, but that the possibility for exceptions was important in some cases.  
 
According to several interviewees, the document was a good and useful tool for the new 
EU member states. Informant C called the document: “a great piece of work, a real 
achievement and a step forward in the process of setting common and higher standards 
for COI work”. The respondents from both offices agreed that this was a good document 
for other EU member states that had less experience with COI and were currently setting 
up their first offices. Still, informant F stressed that the document could not replace the 
training and guidance received from experienced colleagues.  
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5.3.3.3. The ECS Database 
Informant D explained that the ECS Database system is meant to function in such a way 
that some representatives are made responsible for COI on countries on which they have 
expertise. Informant F gave the example of Sweden and Denmark who are now officially 
the contacts for all member states to send questions to concerning Iraq. Up until then, 
they had only received two questions. Informant D explained that Norway has become 
the official contact on Somalia in the ECS system. Informant F also mentioned that there 
have been disagreements about the degree of public access to the information on the 
database. Informant D explained that this is an entirely closed database where only COI 
experts have access. Concerning the database, the dilemma of time and prioritising their 
own work was brought up again. Informant C felt it was too slow and bureaucratic, as 
informant D also mentioned was the weakness of the system. The latter said the general 
attitude was that people felt there were too many cooperation forums, and they could 
hardly see how they would have time to be involved in one more. The concern that 
harmonisation into such a database might affect the quality of COI to actually lowering 
standards was raised several times. 
 
5.3.3.4. A Joint Support Office in 2010? 
When asked about the joint European office predicted for 2010, informant C mentioned 
that it could be a first step to start gathering information physically in one place, but that 
a functioning well-established EU office where all COI was collected and available was a 
long way away. The latter then warned of the danger of such an office replacing national 
agencies for reasons that this would quite possibly lead to lower standards of COI. 
Several others announced this concern. “It is very important that you set standards by 
looking to those who excel at it and make the others strive to achieve that level, not that 
we focus on minimum standards”, explained informant E and concluded that 
“harmonisation is very important in the sense of raising standards, not in the sense of 
achieving only one opinion through a shared office.” Informant B questioned the 
prospects of a joint office on a practical level: “how are they going to recruit people to 
the office in order to make sure they can match the competence our national offices have? 
How can they expect to delegate such a tremendous workload onto fewer people and 
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expect the standards of information we have today to stay the same?” He/she also pointed 
out the fact that Norway would probably not have any significant influence in shaping 
this central office. Informant G also expressed this concern and pointed out the necessity 
of freedom for every COI agency to collect information.  
 
5.4. Summary                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
The comparison of the three sets of reports in the first part of this chapter concluded that 
there were important differences between them. In fact, very few COI products from the 
two agencies were comparable, if one wanted to compare information on the same 
country from the same year. This comparison suggests that the EU harmonisation process 
of COI has not resulted in similar reports to the extent where one could guaranty that 
processors of asylum cases would have access to the same COI, ultimately resulting in 
the same outcome for an application, regardless of which COI agency was consulted. 
This conclusion questions the probability of the goal of a Common European Asylum 
System as a fully harmonised system being reachable within the scheduled timeframe of 
2010.75  
 
When comparing the answers from the conducted interviews, an important observation is 
that there are differences in how the agencies proceed in producing FFM reports, but 
much convergence in how they relate to the different components of the EU 
harmonisation process of COI. Firstly, the data point to decision-making procedures in 
the Danish case as being more formal and more controlled, seeing that a written 
document is created by all the involved authorities, which specifies in great detail what 
questions must be answered in the FFM reports. There is no such formal written 
equivalent in the preparation of a FFM report for the Norwegian COI office, and there is 
generally more room for decision-making over topics to include in a new report. 
Furthermore, they pointed out that the embassy networks in the countries of origin highly 
influence the choice of sources that are used, and that you can get a different feeling for a 
                                                
75European Council, 13.12.2004. The Hague Programme : Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the European Union <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf> p. 8 
[24.10.08] 
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situation depending on which source you talk to. Also in regards to national legislation on 
the subject of freedom of information, the answers of the interviews confirm that the civil 
servants in the Norwegian COI office enjoy more freedom to judge what reports should 
be public and which must be classified, whereas the COI experts in the Danish office do 
not have this option. The civil servants were in favour of the procedures of their 
respective offices, both on the topics of decision-making and legislation.  
 
Probing further into the types of exchange of information that currently take place within 
the context of the EU, some forms of cooperation were favoured more than others by 
both offices, such as the Eurasil meetings for their networking benefits. Cooperation in 
the forms of a shared ECS Database, a future Joint Support COI Office, and EU 
documents providing guidelines for COI, were generally given less attention. This was 
mostly because they were time-consuming without giving clear benefits, and could also 
be impossible to realise on a practical level. The interviewees also explained that there is 
considerable bilateral cooperation and communication between the Norwegian and the 
Danish agencies, and that this exchange has occurred since the two agencies were 
formed.  
 
Do the data from the interviews point to factors that might set the course in the direction 
of more or less future cooperation of the two agencies in the harmonisation of COI? 
Attempts to answer this question will be presented in the analysis of the following 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS: MATCHING PATTERNS 
 
 
Do the data from the interviews point towards likely future tendencies of how the 
Norwegian and Danish COI agencies might cooperate in the EU’s harmonisation process 
of COI? The theoretical propositions from the four new institutional perspectives in 
chapter three are the point of departure to respond to this question. As previously 
explained, although the four theories are all commonly categorised as new institutional 
theories, the rational choice new institutionalist perspective can be said to have the least 
in common with the others, bearing the most resemblance to pedigree rational choice 
theory. It was therefore treated as the ‘rival explanation’ in contrast to the other three that 
are considered to be ‘cultural’ perspectives. When applying this divide to the three 
categories introduced by Sjursen (2008: 2), it followed that the four theories could assist 
in predicting the likelihood of further cooperation of the two agencies through the manner 
in which they perceived the harmonisation process of COI predominantly for its 
pragmatic problem-solving capacities, its qualities as a promoter of universal rights to 
asylum, or as a component in providing a shared European community.76 The main 
findings will be presented in the order of the propositions from chapter three, followed by 
an attempt to combine the results into a stronger analytical model. 
 
6.1. Rational Choice Institutionalism 
 
6.1.1. Formal Organisation  
As was explained in chapter three, rational choice new institutionalism recognises the 
importance of institutions in the sense that they create formal constraints to the rational 
actors that must play by the rules (Peters 1999: 43). From the comparison made by 
looking at the domestic bureaucratic context of the two agencies and from the replies of 
the interviewees, it was shown how such constraints take the form of formal organisation 
and legislation. Concerning the freedom of decision-making, chapter four showed that the 
                                                
76See Annex B for the theoretical model that summed up chapter three.  
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Danish COI agency is placed directly under the Vice-Director of the Danish Immigration 
Service, whereas the Norwegian agency does not figure on the Norwegian Directorate of 
Immigration’s organisational map. Also, the Danish COI office has no independent name 
or website equivalent to the Norwegian agency. The latter also has a legal document 
underlining the impartiality of its products. These differences could be interpreted as 
tighter control structures in the Danish case compared to the Norwegian agency. This 
interpretation was further strengthened by the answers of the Danish interviewees in 
chapter five, who explained that there is a ‘kommisorium’ document that must be 
approved by all the involved authorities, including the DIS, the RAB, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the National Commissioner of Police before a FFM can take place. 
There is no such formal written document in the Norwegian case, where there is more 
room for discussion on content and writing format of reports. Regarding legislation, 
chapter four sketched how the Aliens Acts of the two countries affect the COI agencies 
indirectly in size and tasks because the content of the COI reports are directly linked to 
the asylum applications in each country. The change in the Danish Aliens Act, perceived 
as controversial in the EU, influences both the amount of applications and what kind of 
applications needing COI, resulting in the COI department downsizing to half its size and 
taking on other projects as well as producing COI. From comparing the Freedom of 
Information Acts, the main difference relevant to COI work is that the Norwegian civil 
servants, in line with EU guidelines, have the possibility to classify information whereas 
the Danish COI experts have no such option. The interviewees from the Norwegian 
agency confirmed that not only does this option exist; they also have frequent discussions 
on when and how a document should be classified. Recent changes in legislation have 
also shown that Norway has kept the possibility of classifying documents, whereas the 
changes in the Danish Freedom of Information Act towards EU standards will not change 
the full openness of COI reports.  
 
These differences in formal rules suggest that the civil servants in the Norwegian COI 
office are less constrained within their organisational framework than their Danish 
counterparts. Rational choice institutionalism would claim that the Norwegian civil 
servants enjoy more room for decision-making in the form of rational calculation within 
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their institutional framework than do the Danish COI experts. Do the data point to such a 
rational calculation taking place? 
 
6.1.2. The Logic of Give and Take 
Rational choice institutionalism sees the world consisting of individuals who apply a 
rational, self-maximising cost/benefit logic to the situations they face. From the data 
collected, one can soon observe that when asked about the various forms of EU 
cooperation, the informants use a specific terminology to describe their views on this 
subject. The expressions “useful to us/me”, “beneficial”, “of interest to me”, “something 
worth my time”, “what we can gain from”, “this may cost us”, “we could lose” and 
“rewarding”, were the predominant ways of describing their own attitudes when 
discussing the various types of EU cooperation that they face.  
 
Not only is there a terminology that suggests a cost and benefit logic, but also in the 
arguments themselves there is a process of weighing options according to predicted 
consequences. As detailed in chapter five, the Eurasil meetings are spoken of as “useful”, 
not because they prove to be informative in themselves, but because of the networking 
that goes on between experts at these forums, where one is open to finding potential 
exchange partners. The potential new partner must fill certain ‘criteria’ in order for the 
offices to start the exchange. The logic is that if they are to supply COI to others, they 
must also get something in return that makes the relationship worthwhile. The desired 
situation is that of swift, unproblematic exchange between equals to the mutual benefit of 
both parties. 
 
The same line of reasoning is used when the interviewees state their views on the 
suggested joint FFMs. It seems that something can be gained by exchanging information 
during these trips, but again there are clear ‘criteria’ for such a cooperation to be 
worthwhile. The officials point to various ways in which the benefits of cooperation on 
FFMs can be outweighed by potentially greater losses in the time spent for all parties to 
agree on all issues beforehand, as well as the information available to them from their 
sources, to the extent that it could even be impossible to cooperate. 
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The same calculating logic can be seen when the informants express their views on the 
document “EU Common Guidelines for Processing COI” and the ECS Database. These 
were generally not seen as useful to the interviewees and were thought of as costly in the 
sense that they were time-consuming, without receiving anything in return. Yet they were 
described as “useful tools” for the new EU member states who, from what they could see, 
would benefit from these forms of cooperation.  
 
The picture emerging from the argumentation above is that most of the exchange of 
information takes place bilaterally and in the form of a ‘give and take’ relationship. One 
recognises that one needs to give a little of what one has in order to get a bit of what one 
desires. On the other hand, if nothing is to be gained, ‘the deal’s off’ or would never be 
born in the first place.  
 
6.1.3. The Freedom to Change. 
The logic of calculating costs and benefits in the choice of the form of cooperation 
desired is proof of the experts’ freedom of decision-making. Although certain formal 
constraints were identified, seemingly stricter for the Danish COI agency than for the 
Norwegian one, the interviewees stated that they had considerable freedom in their 
choice of sources and can evaluate the quality of information as they see fit, thereby also 
the choice of exchange and cooperation partners. The freedom the experts enjoy shows 
that there is room within their institution to make certain rapid changes if current factors 
in their environment suggest that it is more beneficial to do so. This is in line with a 
rational choice perspective. In addition, the officials from both offices stressed that there 
were no rules from the EU that dictated how they must cooperate or how to process COI. 
The fact that the experts can choose which types of cooperation to focus on can also 
create more variation than if the actors had no choice but to conform to all cooperation, 
regardless of costs and benefits.  
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6.1.4. What’s in it for Me? 
At this point, one can conclude that elements of a rational and calculating logic are 
present in the way the COI experts currently relate to the various forms of cooperation 
within the harmonisation process, and that they enjoy considerable freedom in the choice 
of such cooperation. There is a “what’s in it for me/us?” reasoning in the general dynamic 
of relating to cooperation at the supranational level. In chapter three, a connection was 
made between the rational choice perspective and the perception of the harmonisation 
process of COI as a pragmatic problem-solving process. Indeed, it seems that the answers 
from the civil servants suggest that they perceive the harmonisation process as first and 
foremost a potential problem-solver. Even if there are differences between the two COI 
agencies in the extent of freedom they enjoy, the officials choose cooperation in the form 
of networking at Eurasil meetings, resulting in bilateral cooperation and an increase in the 
exchange of COI between the EU and Schengen COI agencies. Following this reasoning, 
the rational choice model could support a prediction where the two COI agencies are 
likely to cooperate in the harmonisation process in future because of the benefits of the 
Eurasil meetings, but that this cooperation will not be as comprehensive as it would have 
been, had all forms of cooperation been considered rewarding.  
 
Yet two important questions remain. Firstly, what do the interviewees see as costs and 
benefits? In the interviews, time and information are frequently mentioned in the 
argumentation. Time seems to be a key concept as something you win or lose. 
Information is also seen as something you can get more or less of, also in better or worse 
quality. The aim, in short, is to obtain the best quality COI possible, which one is able to 
achieve with the maximum amount of time at one’s disposal. These goals are different 
from private incentives of personal gain such as wealth, power and prestige, described as 
the universal motives of actors according to rational choice theory. Motives of private 
gains were never mentioned in regards to the interviewees’ own attitudes towards COI 
cooperation. One might argue that if the actors do not produce high standards of COI, 
employment can become insecure, and that if, on the other hand, their products are of a 
high standard, this may lead to promotion and recognition for the civil servants. Though 
such motives may be underlying constants (Egeberg 1999: 459), they do not seem to be 
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in focus when the civil servants explain the factors involved in their decision-making in 
relation to COI cooperation. Furthermore, the picture that is formed by the experts does 
not give the impression of the institution being merely a ‘tool’ for them to obtain private 
gains. Rather, secondly, it is worth asking: who do they speak of when saying “I” and 
“we”?  
 
6.2. Normative Institutionalism 
 
6.2.1. Who’s Preferences? 
When looking at the data from a normative institutionalist perspective, the picture one 
sees is not merely of the civil servants maximising self-interest within the blank walls of 
a formal structure. As chapter three explains, individual behaviour and preferences are 
also influenced by the institutional culture of which they are a part. In both agencies, high 
quality, current, impartial, and fully covering COI was described by the civil servants as 
their most important and desired goal. Far from being of a private nature, this goal, 
shared by all the bureaucrats in both institutions, can be said to be an expression of the 
value of high independent professional standards (Jørgensen 2007: 372).  
 
The value of obtaining the best quality COI is further defined by the informants by 
adding: for whom? While being asked to comment on the document with COI guidelines, 
the informants mentioned that they could not spend time crosschecking their work to see 
if everything they do corresponds to such guidelines. This would delay them in their main 
task: that of providing high quality information for their users, the directorates and 
appeals boards. This was their priority above all other concerns. In fact, in all the 
arguments of what forms of cooperation are considered beneficial or not, what seems to 
be implied in this calculation is: what would be the most beneficial for the needs and 
objectives of our domestic ‘users’? These statements show that values of accountability 
(Jørgensen and Bozeman 2007: 364) towards institutions in the national public 
administration that are dependent on them are strong. The answers also show 
embeddedness, support and loyalty towards national obligations over supranational 
requests. Another value expressing accountability is that of responsibility for the 
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protection of individual rights and minorities (ibid: 360), expressed by the civil servants’ 
concern for preserving a high standard of COI in regards to the rights of the asylum 
seekers.  
 
Embeddedness, support, confidence, and loyalty towards their own public administration 
can also be detected when the civil servants say they are in favour of their national 
legislation on freedom of information, as well as preferring their own bureaucratic 
regulations on decision-making when preparing for a FFM. The first supports the value of 
high degrees of openness and transparency of the public administration towards its 
environment (ibid: 364), the second degrees of agency autonomy in decision-making, or 
professional independence (Jørgensen 2007: 374). The hierarchy of preferences that the 
interviewees express seems in fact to be endogenous, in line with the goals of their 
institution, which is predominantly focused on domestic concerns.  
 
6.2.2. Identities, Roles and Matching 
When the interviewees talk about costs and benefits for “me” and “us”, the impression 
one gets is that these terms refer to the person(s) in a certain way. As seen in chapter 
three, normative institutionalism sees individuals as a collection of roles and identities 
and that which of these is awoken depends on the situation (Egeberg 1999: 458). Facing 
this particular situation of the requests for cooperation from the EU, when the civil 
servants say: “it is not in my interest”, what seems to be implied is: “it is not in the 
interest of someone filling my role as the country expert of country X in the national COI 
agency Y”. The data points to the identity of “I” as being anchored in the institutional 
role that the civil servants occupy. “We” becomes the shared group identity of those 
working in the same institution, and institutional gains become “our” gains. Egeberg 
explains that: “an identity is a conception of self organised into rules for matching action 
to situations” (1999: 458). Following this line of reasoning, if the civil servants refer to 
themselves as ‘the country expert of the Norwegian/Danish COI agency’, then they will 
choose among options for matching in accordance with what is expected from their role 
in their office. In fact, suppose the norm in their institution is to relate to supranational 
cooperation in a rational, cost/benefit manner. If so, one might argue that this is the 
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appropriate and expected way of matching in the institution when faced with this specific 
situation. Is there such a norm in the two agencies?  
 
6.2.3. The Norm of Rationality 
There are no written rules or control mechanisms that explicitly state that such a 
prioritisation of domestic concerns over EU cooperation must always be made, but one 
can gather from the responses that such is the norm in the two agencies. Argumentation 
such as “we include what we feel makes sense to us from EU cooperation” implies taking 
part in judging what is useful to the agency, and shows further loyalty to the institution. 
In this explanation, a rational calculation of costs and benefits is taking place within an 
institutional frame that sets the agenda for the priority of preferences. Making this 
calculation is expected because it serves domestic interests to have the experts choose 
which is the most beneficial strategy. As Egeberg argues, “the two logics (the logic of 
consequentiality and the logic of appropriateness) may operate simultaneously in 
concrete decision situations” (1999: 458). Similarly, Christensen and Røvik announce 
that “the extensive application of rationality and the logic of consequentiality is a very 
strong ideology permeating modern organizations, to such an extent that behaving 
appropriately often means demonstrating clearly that one is acting in accordance with this 
logic” (1999: 177). 
 
The goal of harmonising COI in the EU can also be expressed in terms of norms. It is 
expected of the EU member and Schengen states to participate and cooperate in all the 
five forms of cooperation. Yet the data do not suggest that the COI agencies cooperate as 
a result of the civil servants adopting the norms and expectations of the EU. The norm in 
the domestic agencies is that they must prioritise national obligations, thereby 
cooperating on the arenas where they benefit. In this sense, one could conclude that 
because of the norm of rationally weighing costs and benefits for domestic concerns, 
normative theory applied to this study partly supports the conclusions drawn above by the 
rational choice institutionalist model. The reasoning is the same: the COI agencies will 
continue to cooperate in the harmonisation process because it is beneficial for domestic 
interests to cooperate at the Eurasil meetings. Other forms of cooperation are not 
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prioritised because they are not beneficial, something that delays harmonisation. This 
gives further support to the role of the EU as a problem-solver as being central in how the 
agencies perceive the harmonisation process. Yet the normative perspective adds the 
crucial understanding that costs and benefits are institutionally defined in these two cases, 
and that the civil servants in both agencies show identity formation and loyalty to the 
norms and values of their respective national public administrations. Such identities and 
loyalties may come into conflict with the two other aspects of the harmonisation process: 
that of a promoter of human rights to asylum and a provider of a European community. 
Even if incentives in the environment would suggest a change, these domestic values 
seem to be powerful and long lasting concepts that do not change easily. This perspective 
suggests that a change towards further harmonisation takes longer than a simple 
calculation. Where do these institutional norms and values of the two agencies come 
from, and just how slow may such a change be? 
 
6.3. Historical Institutionalism 
 
6.3.1. The Value of Traditions 
As formerly described, historical institutionalism looks for the origins of institutions from 
the forces at play of the time they were born, and sees how path-dependent processes 
evolve, possibly interrupted by critical junctures. First of all, in this context, a critical 
juncture did not occur from the introduction of the EU’s harmonisation process of COI. 
From the data it is evident that cooperation has been introduced as suggestions, 
guidelines and requests to participation, not forced upon the national COI agencies. From 
this it can be concluded that the two offices have not been set on an entirely new and 
potentially similar development path to insure survival as a result of great changes and 
pressures from the environment, in this context the EU. Now remains the question of 
whether one can observe a path-dependency in regards to the domestic norms and values 
that have been identified, which might challenge the harmonisation process. 
  
Christensen explains that the Norwegian bureaucracy is characterised by four state 
traditions: “the sovereign rationality-bounded or centralised state; the institutional state; 
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the corporatist-pluralist state; and the supermarket state” (2003: 165), whereof the first 
three “explain the historical development of the strong Norwegian state over the last 100-
150 years” (ibid: 184), and that the combination of the centralised and institutional 
traditions best describes Norwegian governance (ibid). In fact, he explains that in the 
Norwegian public administration, the bureaucrats are reluctant to the values of the 
supermarket-state that were introduced in the 1980s, even though ideas from NPM have 
had and continue to have some influence (ibid: 183). Similarly, Jørgensen points to the 
Danish bureaucratic traditions of the centralised and institutional state (2007: 377) and 
that values of “rational choice favourites: career opportunities and good payment” scored 
the lowest in his research of values of civil servants towards their public administration 
(ibid: 375). Do the norms and values previously identified correspond to these 
bureaucratic traditions?  
 
6.3.2. The Rational-Legal Order 
The tradition of the rational centralised state, with its origins in the concept of the 
Rechtsstaat, can be said to have taken fully form in Norway from the kings’ loss of 
power in 1884 (Christensen 2003: 166). This tradition is characterised by a purposely-
designed centralised structure of a hierarchical civil service, and where executive and 
legislative powers form a close relationship (ibid). The foundation of the bureaucratic 
Rechtsstaat, as defined by Weber, is a rational, neutral and impartial public 
administration that provides due process and the rule of law (Olsen 2007:  5). Weber 
described bureaucratisation as “an inevitable part of a historical trend towards 
rationalisation – Entzauberung – of life in the west” (ibid: 9). Jørgensen claims that the 
values of legality and due process are one of four main values in the ‘general public 
ethos’ that his research on civil servants in Denmark has identified. These traditional 
values, he explains, stem from the rationally bound Rechtsstaat, established in Denmark 
over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (2007: 377). The concept of procedural 
rationality in the two Nordic bureaucracies is therefore as old as the public 
administrations themselves and was the result of the political and ideological influences 
of the time. The fact that the interviewees in these two cases apply an instrumental 
cost/benefit logic when they are acting in the roles of civil servants of the two public 
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administrations could therefore be linked to the values and norms of this bureaucratic 
tradition of impartially weighing choices according to what best serves the institution and 
those in need of its services. It does not seem to be the case that there is a rational 
calculation taking place wherein personal gains are the essential driving forces that exist 
independently of their institutional context.  
 
6.3.3. Professionalism and Autonomy 
Previously, the value of providing the best quality COI for domestic purposes was 
identified as the highest ranking desired goal amongst the civil servants. In addition, the 
data also shows that the officials felt that political changes did not influence their work in 
the sense that their information stayed objective. As shown, the Danish Aliens Act after 
2002 has decreased the number of COI experts considerably, and the binding 
‘kommisorium’ document gives clear direction as to what the content of the reports 
should be. Nevertheless, the COI civil servants are still recognised as professional experts 
who in the final stages produce information that follows the bureaucratic value of 
impartiality. In Norway, though somewhat more flexible, there are also decision-making 
procedures over the content of FFM reports, but the weight remains on the recognition of 
the expertise and professionalism of the COI civil servants and the impartiality of their 
products.  
 
Christensen explains how already in the early to mid nineteenth century, professional 
groups grew rapidly in the public administration in Norway and requested directorates 
and agencies that were to be independent of the ministries (2003: 163). The early 
formation of public administrative values related to profession and expertise, but also to 
the value of a neutral public apparatus where the agencies became relatively autonomous 
from their respective ministries. As mentioned, the NDI has gone through three reforms 
that have accorded more or less political autonomy to the NDI and IAB (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2005: 3-4). Nevertheless, to this day agencies are not formally a part of the 
ministries in Norway (Martens 2005: 5). Denmark also has strong and widespread values 
of independent professional standards in its public administration. This is a second set of 
values that Jørgensen identifies in his research results of the Danish ‘general public 
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ethos’ (2007: 372). He explains that, in Denmark, “independent professional standards 
have their roots in the general professionalisation of public services during the twentieth 
century and earlier” (ibid: 377). However, the Danish bureaucracy developed a monistic 
structure, the regular agencies being formally a part of the ministries, thereby enjoying 
less independence (Martens 2005: 5). The differences previously identified in the formal 
organisation, organisational placement, and legal matters between the two COI agencies 
could be interpreted to reflect this traditional difference in autonomy of the two counties. 
In fact, Martens suggests that Danish agencies operate less independently (than Norway 
and Finland) at the EU level because of their close ties to the ministries (2005: 12).  
 
The civil servants in both agencies expressed strong professional values. The difference 
between them lies in the degree of autonomy. Because the civil servants of each office 
support their own structure of decision-making, this suggests that the value of autonomy 
of the agency is somewhat stronger in the Norwegian agency than in the Danish office.  
 
6.3.4. Public Insight 
Jørgensen identifies a third value in the Danish ‘general public ethos’ as “there must be 
insight for the public into public organisations” (2007: 372). He explains how the value 
of public insight is anchored in the ideals of the Rechtsstaat, but also in Danish 
democratic culture, which has traditionally been a homogeneous, integrative and 
collective one (ibid: 377). Christensen also points out the institutional tradition of the 
Norwegian state, which was based on a homogenous and low-conflict society with a high 
level of cultural and collective interaction and integration (2003: 173-4). It was in this 
tradition that the public was also meant to participate and interact with the public 
administration to further public goals, thereby promoting openness and insight into the 
bureaucracy. Openness towards the public was later also given an institutionalised 
expression by the establishment of the Ombudsman in the 1960s, where the public in 
organized form could file complaints to the civil service (ibid: 175). It was during this 
time, in 1970, that the Norwegian Freedom of Information Act was written and would set 
the norm for a high level of insight, as did the Danish Act of 1985. 
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From the data, it is clear that the civil servants of both agencies support their Freedom of 
Information Acts. Because the legislation in both countries emphasises high insight, the 
value of high public access to information is strong amongst all the informants. The 
difference is again a question of degree. Because the Norwegian officials support their 
legislation that opens for the possibility of classifying their documents, this could suggest 
that the value of public access to information is generally somewhat lower amongst the 
Norwegian than amongst the Danish informants.  
 
6.3.5. Accountability 
“The institutional state traditionally combines universal rights with the special care of 
vulnerable groups” claims Christensen (2003: 177). In the data, it is clear that the civil 
servants from both agencies express both feelings of accountability and responsibility 
towards meeting the needs of their respective directorates and appeals boards, but also 
concern for whether the rights of asylum seekers are being met when discussing the 
standards of COI in the processing of applications. They insisted on the importance of 
razing standards, especially in the new EU member states, to ensure that this universal 
right will be met. The impression one gets is that not only is their focus on providing the 
highest quality COI for their respective directorates and appeals boards, there is also 
shared awareness and feelings of responsibility for their part in the processing of asylum 
applications and ultimately the verdict and its implications.  
 
Accountability here is meant in a traditional sense: “a subjective felt sense of obligation” 
(Christensen 2003: 177), motivated by the sense of shared purpose, or as Jørgensen puts 
it, “the devotion to a cause” (2007: 377). The latter also points to the final ingredient 
identified in his results of the ‘general public ethos’ in Denmark: “the public sector 
should be accountable to society as such” (ibid: 372). Jørgensen again points to the 
principle traditions of the Rechtsstaat, which should guaranty the rights of the individual 
and the citizen, but also to the development of the welfare system in Denmark that 
promotes the idea of the state providing for the needs of not just individual citizens but 
also groups in society (ibid: 377). He adds that the feeling of serving the greater good 
may also have its roots in Protestantism, which is the state religion in both Norway and 
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Denmark. From the perspective of the institutional tradition of the public sector, 
Christensen describes Norway as the ‘moral community’ (2003: 172) where, from 1884 
to 1940, Durkheim’s communitarian ideology of Gemeinschaft was a strong influence. 
This was later to be followed by the Labour Party’s welfare state principles wherein it 
was the state’s responsibility to provide integration and equality (ibid: 174).  
 
6.3.6. Loyalty 
The interviewees from both offices stated that they agree with and support their own 
Freedom of Information Act and their decision-making structures. As the data shows, 
they also justify them. However, this tendency does not merely point to variation in the 
degrees of insight of information and of bureaucratic control mechanisms amongst the 
civil servants. The answers also express loyalty and support to their own national public 
administration. The fact that they always prioritise domestic concerns before other 
commitments is also an indicator of loyalty towards one’s own administration. 
 
Christensen explains that in the Norwegian institutional state tradition, “civil servants are 
carriers of certain values and not neutral instruments independent of the political 
leadership” (ibid: 173). He refers to research that has shown that identities and loyalties 
are formed within the public administration in Norway (ibid: 172). Derived from a 
homogenous culture, shared norms and values as well as trust and confidence are traits 
reflected in government institutions. The statements of loyalty and support the informants 
expressed are therefore in line with this institutional tradition. In fact, if one looks at 
public values in general, research shows that in Norway, the population at large trusts and 
supports the political and administrative institutions (ibid: 173). In the case of Denmark, 
the loyalty and support that the civil servants accord their public administration is also 
reflected in the tradition of the general democratic culture, where Denmark has scored 
highest in European studies on populations’ confidence in their public institutions 
(Jørgensen 2007: 378). Therefore, also this aspect of the received answers seems 
anchored in the two state traditions.  
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6.3.7. Path-Dependency and the Possibility of Change 
From this dive into the Norwegian and Danish bureaucratic traditions, some links have 
been drawn between the civil servants’ replies and the historical background of the public 
administrations of which they are a part. Traditions still exist and shape the values and 
norms amongst the bureaucrats that were interviewed. Even though the civil servants use 
typical terms of cost/benefit rationality, their values seem to be attached to institutional 
public administrative traditions, and less to the concept of the super-marked state. This 
observation suggests that the two institutions develop in a way that is path-dependent and 
are therefore a challenge to change. However, chapter three stated that path-dependency 
does not exclude change. In fact, it seems the norms of rationality and independent 
professionalism allow for relating to the harmonization process as a problem-solver in a 
manner that benefits the institution and is in line with the loyalty one has to one’s own 
public administration. Yet a sense of loyalty, particularly regarding the value of 
accountability towards one’s own administration and towards human rights, may be 
challenged by the other two aspects of the harmonisation process. Paired with a path-
dependent development, this points towards a limited future cooperation and 
harmonization for both cases. 
 
Thelen points out that in order to understand which environmental changes create 
changes in which institutions, attention must be paid to the particular reproduction 
mechanisms of the institution in question (1999: 397). As noted, the civil servants 
express loyalty and support to their own administration. This support can be interpreted 
as having the effect of “self-reinforcing positive feedback” as Krasner suggests (1988: 
83). As was explained above, these attitudes of trust towards the public administration are 
reflected in the general population, and this in turn can surely be self-reinforcing in a 
democratic culture. Furthermore, Thelen claims that the variation of reproduction 
processes explains how similar changes in the environment can create changes in some 
institutions and not others (1999: 397). An example Thelen mentions is how international 
trends can have different domestic outcomes, some more resilient to change and reform 
than others (ibid: 400). This comparison of the history of the two cases suggests that 
because of the expressed loyalty and support from the civil servants towards the norms 
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and values of their own public administration, the differences in degree of organisational 
control and public access to information may be reinforced over time. Such reinforced 
differences may therefore contribute to setting the agencies on separate development 
paths in the context of further cooperation in the harmonisation process.  
 
From the use of this retrospective lens, emphasis has been on traditional norms and 
values of the civil servants. The following analysis will look more closely at the notion of 
socialisation of the civil servants that may currently be taking place, all the while keeping 
their cultural past in mind. 
 
6.4. Sociological Institutionalism 
 
6.4.1. Two Cultures 
From a sociological institutionalist perspective, one looks for clear signs of a cultural 
system that sets the context within which the actors form their social reality. This would 
again affect the cognitive perceptions of the individuals in such a way that the orientation 
that it provides becomes intuitive to them (Scott 1995: 41). They have internalised these 
perceptions and are thereby socialised into their institutional environment.  
 
Because this thesis focuses on the critical point where national and supranational policies 
meet, a distinction between a national and a supranational culture is made. Firstly, the EU 
harmonisation initiative, with the norms and values on cooperation that come with it, is 
placed into a EU supranational culture. These include values that are expressed by the 
European Council and the Commission in regards to the Common European Asylum 
System. As mentioned previously, these are expressed as solidarity and shared 
responsibility within the community; and norms in the form of expectations to cooperate 
and adapt to common standards.77 It is predominantly the aspect of the harmonisation 
process as a component in providing a value-based community that is in question when 
searching for signs of socialisation: ethical norms and values that characterise the EU 
                                                
77European Council, 13.12.2004. The Hague Programme : Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the European Union <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf> p. 8 
[24.10.08] 
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community, distinguishes it from other communities, and provides identity, belonging 
and integration to its members (Sjursen 2008: 2). Yet it also concerns the rights-based 
aspect, as the community’s members must also believe in its ability to promote human 
rights, as it claims to do.78 Secondly figures the national culture, with the traditional 
norms, values and loyalties identified above. The normative institutional perspective has 
shown that the civil servants prioritise domestic over supranational concerns. Does 
sociological institutionalism supply further support to domestic culture being the most 
influential in the orientation of the civil servants?  
 
6.4.2. Who Are “We”? 
One sign of an existing culture is to see how the actors identify themselves. The data seen 
from a normative institutional perspective points to the interviewees as having 
preferences that are endogenous to the institution, and that they identify with the role that 
they have as domestic civil servants. When probing deeper into the conception of the 
‘self’, one question is to ask whether they ever think of “we” as “we in the EU/Schengen” 
or if “we” always referred to “we in the national offices”. The answer from the 
informants exclusively confirmed the latter. When questioned about the Eurasil meetings, 
the informants always perceived of themselves as country representatives, regardless of 
whether they had participated at many or few meetings. This data does not support 
Johnston’s hypothesis that repeated exposure to a supranational community in the form of 
participation at meetings leads to the socialisation of individuals who internalise the new 
culture (2001: 499). In fact, the general impression one is left with is that the 
identification with the domestic level seemed intuitive, as if evident. It did not seem to be 
the case that participation had partly replaced their domestic identity, nor had it 
supplemented an additional part to this identity, as some theorists of socialisation have 
discovered in other cases of participation at the EU institutional level (Egeberg: 1999: 
457). However, it does give support to the view that strong domestic socialisation may 
delay or inhibit socialisation into international institutions (Johnston 2001: 499). The 
answers concerning identity from the data point to the presence of a dominant domestic 
culture that seems unchallenged by EU cooperation. This lack of European orientation 
                                                
78ibid 
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suggests that the community aspect of the harmonisation process does not seem to win 
much support from the two cases. 
 
Still, an interesting exception to the rest of the answers is mentioned: one informant was 
inspired to adopt the understanding of the supranational institution of the importance of 
working together towards common goals as a shared European community. The 
interviewee also mentioned that the general attitude of priority to domestic objectives at 
the office was so strong as to influence him/her to abandon these new concepts and return 
to a domestic understanding of priorities. This comment signals two things. Firstly, the 
domestic orientation of the others is strong and influential. Yet, secondly, the informant 
in question could be said to be adopting an additional identity, that of belonging to a 
EU/Schengen community. This supplementary identity is admittedly not constant, but 
because the informant has reflected on how participation is influencing him/her, this 
proves that the identity of the country representative is not a given. As such, some degree 
of socialisation has taken place in this one occurrence.  
 
6.4.2. Do We Agree? 
Another clue as to whether socialisation has taken place is whether one questions the 
values and understandings of the introduced culture. The data has shown that some 
informants expressed scepticism towards the goal of full harmonisation of COI. They 
question whether a joint COI office would succeed in maintaining the high standards that 
their services currently provide. They also express concern for the quality of COI 
diminishing if the choice of sources and reports were to be limited to a single database. 
The Eurasil meetings are also part of the greater process of integrating the new member 
states in the field of EU asylum policy. As explained in chapter four, universal rights to 
asylum based on the conventions lie at the basis of the European asylum policy, and so 
the Eurasil meetings are arenas where the EU plays its role as a rights-based union as 
well. This role of promoting human rights has been a strong, if not the strongest, 
argument in questions of EU enlargement (Sjursen 2008: 11), yet the civil servants in this 
study prove to be sceptical towards this ability. Informant B asked: “Harmonisation to 
what price?” From these statements, the picture emerging is far from that of actors who 
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have been persuaded, e.g. having their beliefs altered (Johnston 2001: 496) by a new 
culture from which they have internalised norms and values. From their argumentation, it 
seems the civil servants have greater concern for achieving high standards of COI in 
respect to the asylum seekers’ rights to fair and high quality processing of their 
applications than to accomplish a fully harmonised COI system in Europe. The reason 
they gave was that the harmonised system is orientated towards establishing common 
‘minimum standards’,79 as opposed to the highest possible standards. 
 
6.4.3. Socialisation Efforts from the EU 
Socialisation could be said to consist both of those who are socialized into a new culture 
and of those who socialise the newcomers, the reference group who rewards the correct 
behaviour (Johnston 2001: 494). Although the community aspect the Common European 
Asylum System, e.g. solidarity and sharing responsibility between the member states, is 
stressed in the Hague Programme,80 there was little mention of this particular aspect 
during the Eurasil meetings. One community-based expressions found in the data was the 
use of different nametags on the Eurasil meetings. These can be interpreted as active use 
of symbolism defining who is and who is not a member of the EU. The informants noted 
that participants are categorised as national representatives and that the language used 
during the meetings is that of the practical benefits of information exchange for each 
country. Accordingly, the aspect that is given the most weight during the Eurasil 
seminars is that of its role as a practical problem-solver (Sjursen 2008: 2).  
 
6.4.4. Alternative Signs of Socialisation 
Other statements, however, point to some alternative tendencies where socialisation 
might not be clearly confirmed, but may nevertheless be present. The civil servants 
expressed that there was no clear effort on behalf of the Eurasil committee to enhance the 
EU community identity. However, the interviewees pointed out the importance of being 
                                                
79European Commission, 17.2.2006. New Structures, New Approaches: Improving the Quality of Decision 
Making in the Common European Asylum System, Annexes 
<www.ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/docs/sec_2006_189_en.pdf> p. 2 [26.07.08] 
80European Council, 13.12.2004, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in 
the European Union: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/doc/hague_programme_en.pdf> p. 8 
[24.10.08]  
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aware of the developments in the EU, of Norway’s reputation in the EU, and also how 
participation and cooperation gave them influence and had a legitimising effect on 
domestic policy. The issue of reputation within the EU can be interpreted as assigning 
importance to the status one has inside the community. As explained in chapter three, 
Johnston mentions that what he calls ‘social influence’ is a sign of socialisation (Johnston 
2001: 501). Described as a system where rewards or punishments take the form of 
degrees of social status, this concept could be relevant in explaining why the civil 
servants feel that the reputation of their agency in the EU does matter, and that having 
influence at the supranational level is important to them. Similarly, the fact that 
participating in the EU cooperation on COI has the effect of providing confirmation and 
legitimacy to domestic policy, this could be a sign of the status accorded to the social 
value of participating at the EU institutional level, thereby indicating some degree of 
socialisation. 
 
From a notion of a shared community whithin the EU, one could also expect expressions 
of solidarity between the member states, even to the degree of accepting costs (Sjursen 
2008: 2). One observation worth mentioning is that the interviewees from the Norwegian 
and Danish agencies frequently spoke of the new EU member states and how important it 
was for them to reach the same high standards of COI that they had. The document of the 
guidelines for COI was seen as a “good tool” for the new offices, and the ECS Database 
was a good way for the new offices to get access to COI information from other experts. 
This interest could suggest that there has been some orientation towards solidarity in the 
form of offering assistance. The Danish agency has also participated in workshops to 
train new COI agencies on the topic of FFMs. However, given the general arguments of 
costs and benefits of each form of COI cooperation, it seems that even though there is 
expressed an interest in the progress of the new member states, there would be no 
compromising of the time and effort needed for their domestic duties. One might also 
argue that this interest may be motivated by the problem-solving aspect of burden sharing 
from the ‘first country of entry’ principle of the Dublin 2 agreement. This can only be 
fully realised when the boarder member states also have an approved system of minimum 
standards in place. However, in this context the informants also expressed concern for the 
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quality of processing needing to be satisfactory in regards to asylum seekers’ rights in the 
new member states. Here again one sees scepticism towards the abilities of the rights-
based aspect of the harmonisation process. 
  
6.4.5. Copycats 
Another aspect the civil servants mentioned was that the new member states were 
learning from them as established COI agencies through COI cooperation. The two 
offices mentioned that they are regarded as highly competent in the context of the COI 
offices in Europe because of their long experience and their possibility to go on many 
FFMs. In this respect, they can be seen as model institutions that other COI agencies 
imitate. Applying the terms of DiMaggio and Powell (1983: 147), the sum of the COI 
offices can be seen as an organizational field, where it is rational for the new offices to 
imitate those who are seen as successful. Mimetic isomorphism occurs when the 
standards of the model institutions are seen as an ideal that the others adopt. Also, it is 
conceivable that professional isomorphism is taking place in the same direction. Because 
the new member states are currently establishing their COI agencies, the questions of 
qualifications, positions, and responsibilities are involved in the process of defining the 
occupation of COI experts. Here the meetings and networking in Eurasil appear to have 
influence. Coercive isomorphism seems too strong a term to describe the COI 
harmonisation process because the Norwegian and Danish COI experts stated clearly that 
they were in no way bound to any rules on cooperation from the EU institutional level.  
 
6.4.6. Harmonisation as Socialisation 
It is interesting to observe from a sociological perspective that there is high convergence 
in the data on the subject of socialisation into the EU, even though Denmark is an old 
member state and Norway is only a member of Schengen. The general tendency was that 
the identity of a country representative has not clearly been influenced by the EU 
harmonisation process by adopting a sense of belonging to and sharing the values of the 
supranational community. The civil servants seem to be anchored into a predominantly 
national culture where they show scepticism towards the rights-based aspect, and little 
interest in the community aspect of the harmonisation process of COI. The lack of a EU 
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community-based motivation can certainly contribute to slowing down the integration of 
the Norwegian and Danish COI agencies into the harmonisation process. Yet some signs 
of indirect socialisation, such as importance accorded to reputation and legitimacy in the 
context of the EU are simultaneously taking place, suggesting a change towards some 
influence from the supranational level. Another process was identified, namely that the 
Norwegian and Danish cases serve as model institutions in the European context. 
Although this would presumably not affect their own cooperation directly, the processes 
of isomorphism could contribute to the further harmonisation of COI within the EU and 
Schengen area.  
 
6.5. What Now? 
 
What is left after going through the data and looking at it from four angles within new 
institutionalist theory? It seems to be the case that all the theories can explain something, 
but none of them can explain everything. Keeping in mind chapter three, which explained 
that the separation between them is also a constructed one, is it possible to keep a 
contribution from each theory? 
 
6.5.1. Creative Borrowing 
Hall and Taylor presented the strengths and weaknesses of the new institutionalisms and 
declared that: “the time has come for greater interchange among them” and that they 
“favour taking this interchange as far as possible, most fundamentally because each of 
these seems to reveal different yet genuine dimensions of human behaviour and of the 
effects institutions can have on behaviour” (1996: 955). Thelen supports this concept of 
‘interchanging’ between the new institutional theories, but does not propose a full 
synthesis of them, which she claims would undermine fundamental differences (1999: 
380). Instead, she introduces the concept of ‘creative borrowing’ (ibid: 379), explaining 
that she could see benefits of “employing some of the tools of rational choice to sort out 
the logic of the situation and the responses of the actors”, yet adding: “It will not, 
however, substitute for the process-orientated analysis that is characteristic of historical 
institutionalism” (ibid: 400). Studies that have followed since these propositions were 
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made have indeed proven the benefits of such an interchange. Aus, in his study of 
decision-making in the Justice and Home Affairs Council, shows how they “tend to 
adhere to the logic of appropriateness, the logic of consequentiality, or both while 
drafting important legislative acts” (2007: 50). He proceeds to identify conditions under 
which these logics are triggered and suggests to “integrate analytically distinctive 
perspectives […] into a single and presumably more powerful explanatory model” (ibid). 
Christensen and Lægreid declare the need for a multi-perspective approach in analysing 
the dynamic of political control versus agency autonomy of the NDI, to which they 
applied instrumental, negotiation, and cultural path-dependency theory (2009: 28). 
Gornitska and Sverdrup approach the subject of the expert groups of the European 
Commission (such as Eurasil) with a twofold model: the design perspective, where the 
groups are seen as instrumentally designed tools to perform necessary tasks for the 
Commission (2007: 6); and the institutional perspective, where in turn the expert groups 
are recognised as units of local rationality, traditions, and path-dependencies of certain 
norms and values (ibid: 9).  
 
6.5.2. Joining the Threads 
Judging from the findings of this analysis, one could argue that a similar solution of 
creative borrowing is warranted in this comparative study. In line with Hall and Taylor, 
each of these approaches seems to highlight different yet genuine aspects of the collected 
material (1996: 955). Furthermore, the results presented above suggest that the theories 
stand in a dynamic relationship to each other in the manner of supporting and/or 
contesting parts of the other’s views.  
 
The use of rational choice sketched a basic understanding of the formal organisational 
framework of regulations and legislations wherein the civil servants in the Norwegian 
and Danish agencies choose rationally from the five forms of cooperation of the COI 
harmonisation process. This picture was supported by the three other theories. The latter 
three, however, rejected the exogenous individual preferences and ease of redesign 
suggested by rational choice theory. The normative, historical and sociological 
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perspectives supported each other with their ability to give insight into the cultural 
dimension of the two cases.  
 
Although the latter three supported each other, they also provided different insight. The 
normative perspective highlighted the institutional setting in which the civil servants take 
on identities as COI experts for their national public administrations, and share values of 
rational procedures, professionalism, autonomy, public insight, accountability, and 
loyalty that together define the institutional preferences for the rational calculation they 
apply in their choices of European cooperation. The historical dimension added the 
understanding that these norms and values are anchored in the respective Norwegian and 
Danish public administrative traditions. Because the norms and values expressed by the 
civil servants are rooted in their respective history, the development from bureaucratic 
traditions to current values can be described as path-dependent. One could also detect a 
process of positive feedback in the form of loyalty and support towards the civil servant’s 
own public administration that seems to reinforce path-dependency. The sociological 
perspective did not conclude, as some scholars from this line of theory have found, that 
there was a clear tendency for increased socialization of civil servants into a 
supranational EU culture as a result of increasing exposure to the EU arenas in regards to 
COI cooperation. Rather, it gave support to the findings of the two previous theoretical 
approaches by generally concluding upon the particularities of the two institutions, 
showing that the cognitive, intuitive understanding of the civil servants seems firmly 
anchored in domestic culture. However, this perspective also pointed out that some of the 
data could be understood by the concept of ‘social influence’, suggesting signs of indirect 
socialisation into the EU in the form of importance given to awareness of developments 
in the EU, confirmation and legitimacy participation gives to domestic policy, as well as 
one’s influence and reputation in the EU.  
 
In an attempt to join the results from the analysis of each theory, a new model is 
presented at this point. It is not to be seen as a synthesis of new institutional theories. 
Rather, it tries to follow Thelen’s advice: “We might instead strive for creative 
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combinations that recognise and attempt to harness the strengths of each approach” 
(1999: 380).81 
 
It is suggested that the formal organisation and procedures of the two agencies stand as 
an important starting point for the analysis, as well as the rational logic that the civil 
servants clearly apply in relation to EU cooperation. However, this analysis recognised 
that the latter findings could not solely explain the complexity of the two agencies’ 
relation to the EU’s harmonisation process of COI. The initial explanations based on 
rational-choice theory are therefore shown to go through the filter of another set of 
variables that are based on the cultural new institutionalist dimension. The analysis 
proved to identify embeddedness and socialisation into domestic bureaucratic culture, 
where norms, values, identities, cultural understandings and cognition are rooted in 
history and contribute to shaping the formal organisation and rational logic that were 
initially recognised. The composition of these variables defines the path-dependent 
process that describes how the two COI agencies are developing. Yet path-dependency 
does not imply that there is no development towards harmonisation to speak of. 
According to Thelen, a path-dependent development is a dynamic process that is open to 
change, but this change is gradual and depends both on the different components of the 
path-dependency and its reproduction mechanisms (1999: 396-397). This analysis has 
recognised signs of positive feedback that can be self-reinforcing to path-dependency, but 
has also identified signs of social influence that suggest change.  
 
In order to predict the probability of how the harmonisation process will affect the COI 
agencies, it is this path-dependent process that can point to more or less cooperation of 
the two COI agencies in the future by showing how it scores on the three characteristics 
of the EU harmonisation process. In both cases, rational logic has proven to be strong 
within the institutionally defined preferences. Therefore, the EU harmonisation process 
has been understood in the terms of whether or not it can be beneficial to the COI 
agencies, a potential problem-solver. This aspect of how both cases relate to the 
harmonisation process suggests that they will continue to cooperate because the agencies 
                                                
81See Annex C 
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are moderately in favour of cooperation through the Eurasil meetings, but that this 
process is not as rapid as it would have been if all forms of cooperation were considered 
beneficial. Also, both COI offices showed strong domestic socialisation in prevailing 
norms, values, identities and understandings, and low on socialisation into a 
supranational European culture. Therefore, the path-dependent process for both cases 
scores low on the characteristics of the COI harmonisation process as a rights-promoter 
and a community provider, though some signs of social influence suggest slight changes 
towards more importance of these two aspects. Nevertheless, the low scores can be 
interpreted as brakes to the harmonisation process. Together, the theories predict 
moderate future cooperation and slow development towards harmonisation. 
 
Although the collected data from the interviews showed high convergence, some 
differences between the two cases were also identified. Firstly, when summarising the 
differences in formal organisation and procedures between the two COI offices, it was 
recognised that the Danish agency is more strictly regulated and is more locked-in 
regarding its organisational structure, formal procedures, and legislation than is the 
Norwegian office. Accordingly, this could have an impact on how the cases might 
develop differently. With little freedom of decision-making, it is possible that even the 
aspect of the COI harmonisation process that is the most appealing to the agencies, its 
potential problem-solving abilities, could be considerably restricted. In the case of the 
Danish COI agency, its formal procedures for collecting and producing COI suggest less 
compatibility with other COI agencies and EU standards, combined with little freedom to 
change this, thereby further narrowing down the potential usefulness of cooperation and 
harmonisation. Secondly, the data confirmed that the COI agencies have an institutional 
culture where the civil servants show loyalty and support to their respective procedures 
for collecting and producing COI. This positive feedback can lead to reinforcing their 
own system and therefore further restricting the possibilities for change. The Norwegian 
COI office, on the other hand, has a more flexible structure, both in formal organisation, 
procedures and legislation, which allows for more freedom of discussion and decision-
making within the processes of collecting and producing COI. Paired with the Norwegian 
civil servants’ support to this system, a path-dependent development from this COI 
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agency may show more flexibility and compatibility with EU legislation and standards. 
This, in turn, increases the chances of COI cooperation in the EU proving to be useful to 
the Norwegian COI agency and suggests that it will be more likely to cooperate in the 
harmonisation process than the Danish COI office. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS, AND WHAT IS TO COME 
 
 
7.1. The Three Steps of the Research Question 
 
The first spark of curiosity that would set the aim of this master thesis was to learn more 
about on what grounds an asylum application is judged, hence the introduction to 
Country of Origin Information and the discovery of the European Union’s current wish to 
harmonise COI within the overall goal of attaining a ‘Common European Asylum 
System’. The intention was to, firstly, examine how far the harmonisation of COI had 
come, and secondly, to identify what would be the likely future developments of this 
harmonisation process, including its progress and challenges. In order to study how 
‘harmonised’ COI reports in the EU and Schengen area had become to this date, this 
student set out to compare COI reports from different COI agencies in Europe, only to 
discover that merely four COI offices would share these reports (and not all of them) with 
the public. The result was the possibility to compare Fact-Finding Mission reports from 
the Norwegian and Danish COI agencies: the Norwegian Landinfo and the 
Documentation and Project Department of the DIS. The study of the harmonisation of 
COI in the EU and Schengen area was therefore specified to revolve around the activity 
of these two agencies. 
 
The research question aimed to firstly compare reports to see whether there were 
significant differences between the products of the two agencies, resulting in the 
comparison of three sets of reports: FFM reports from Somalia, Nigeria and Iraq. A 
noteworthy variation lied in the surprising number of different information sources 
consulted. For the FFM reports on Somalia, 7 out of 41 primary sources from interviews 
were the same. For the reports on Nigeria, 6 out of 35 primary sources were the same. 
Regarding differences in content between the reports, two observations were judged as 
significant. Firstly, there were several issues raised in either the Norwegian or Danish 
reports that were not mentioned in the corresponding report from the other office. An 
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example was that in the reports on Iraq, the Danish report described the tension between 
Kurds and Arabs as worsening, whereas this was not mentioned in the Norwegian report. 
Secondly, and most importantly, some of the same subjects were given contradictory 
views, depending on the source quoted in one report compared to the other. One example 
was that the Danish report on Nigeria stated that, according to their sources, the risks of 
abuse to victims of trafficking by their agents or families was unfounded, whereas in the 
corresponding Norwegian report, the source expressed concern on this matter. Moreover, 
in the Norwegian report, a source stated that there had been progress on the situation on 
female genital mutilation in Somalia, whereas the source consulted by the Danish 
delegation stated that there had been no such progress.  
 
These differences bring the attention over to the second part of the research question: to 
discuss the significance of these differences in the current context of the COI 
harmonisation process in the EU and Schengen area. In chapter four, the main steps 
towards a harmonised asylum system in the EU and Schengen area were described, 
wherein the harmonisation of COI plays an important part. The goals expressed through 
the Qualifications Directive and the Asylum Procedures Directive to set minimum 
standards for qualifying as a person in need of protection and for processing asylum 
applications, specifically point to the need for more cooperation on COI. Therefore, five 
forms of cooperation have been initiated so that COI can be more easily accessible and 
may become as complete as possible in order to assure the same standard of processing of 
an asylum application, regardless of which EU or Schengen member state is responsible 
for this processing. The first important observation in comparing products between the 
Norwegian and Danish COI agencies was that it was a great challenge to find any COI 
reports that were comparable between the two cases, something that in itself pointed to 
great variation between the products of the two offices. Furthermore, taking into 
consideration the comparison of the three sets of FFM reports, it was argued that the 
differences that were identified do not confirm that processors of asylum applications in 
all EU and Schengen states have full access to all the relevant facts, including precise and 
up-to-date COI, as expressed in the goals of the two Directives. It was shown that the 
variety of information sources could lead to contradictory views on specific subjects that 
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are raised in two reports, and that differences in topics that are raised could result in 
incomplete information. This comparative case study questions whether fully harmonised 
COI, as part of the Common European Asylum System scheduled for 2010, will be 
reached. Though one cannot generalise from the results of this study that only compares 
two cases, the comparison can nevertheless serve as an illustration of variation. 
 
This conclusion on the current state of affairs brings the thesis to its final part of the 
research question. In order to predict the likelihood of how the two COI offices will 
cooperate in the harmonisation process in future, rational-choice, normative, historical 
and sociological new institutional theory were applied. A proposition was drawn from 
each theory as it applied to the study of this thesis by arguing how each one predicts the 
outcome of potential harmonisation by the manner in which it highlighted the aspects of 
the harmonisation process as predominantly a problem-solving process; a promoter of 
rights to asylum; or rather a component in providing a common European community.82 
 
The analysis resulted in a combination of the theoretical propositions as it was discovered 
that each of the new institutional theories gave insight into different yet genuine and 
important aspects of the collected data. Taking the advice of Thelen to use ‘creative 
borrowing’ (1999: 379) between the theories, a new model was drawn in an attempt to 
best capture the different variables and processes that seemed to interfere in the 
likelihood of further cooperation in the harmonisation process for the two cases.83  
 
The starting point in this model was based on a rational-choice perspective. Accordingly, 
the formal organisation and legal framework of the COI agencies were taken into 
account. It was shown that such formal constraints, together with formal procedures for 
collecting and producing COI, suggested that Landinfo enjoys more freedom of decision-
making than its Danish counterpart. The Norwegian COI office has more freedom to 
decide over the content of the reports, whereas the content of the Danish reports is 
exclusively tied to specific COI needed to process asylum applications. These, in turn, are 
                                                
82See Annex B 
83See Annex C 
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affected by the Danish Aliens Act that has undergone important alterations, resulting in a 
far more restrictive policy in granting asylum. Also, the Danish COI agency must publish 
all COI publicly as a result of the Danish Freedom of Information Act, whereas the 
Norwegian agency has the possibility to classify reports. Within this difference of their 
respective institutional framework, the data showed that the civil servants of both COI 
offices did first and foremost relate to the COI harmonisation process in a rational, cost-
benefit calculating manner.  
 
Yet formal organisation and procedures, as well as rational logic, were shown in the 
model to go through a filter of a cultural dimension. This is because, when analysing the 
data through the lenses of normative, historical and sociological institutionalism, it 
became clear that the rational logic that the civil servants applied was, in both cases, 
rooted in the general domestic institutional norm of how to relate to such supranational 
cooperation, and that preferences were defined by an institutional culture into which the 
civil servants took on identities in their roles as national COI experts. Accordingly, they 
expressed values of high degree of rationality; professionalism; autonomy; public insight; 
accountability; and loyalty. These values proved to be anchored in the respective 
Norwegian and Danish national bureaucratic traditions. Socialisation into domestic 
institutional culture seemed generally to be intuitive and dominant as opposed to a 
possible EU orientation. 
 
From this filter, a process of path-dependency was drawn to predict the likelihood of 
further cooperation of the two COI agencies, depending on how they scored on the three 
aspects of the harmonisation process as a pragmatic problem-solver, a promoter of rights 
to asylum, or a component in providing a European community. The development of both 
agencies was described as path-dependent, a development where change is not excluded, 
but is challenging and slow. This path-dependent process was identified in both cases as 
being reinforced by positive feedback from the civil servants in the form of their 
expressed loyalty and support to the specific procedures of their respective institutions. 
This reinforcement signals even further difficulties for change. Yet the model also reveals 
that some degree of social influence from the EU in the form of expressed importance of 
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awareness of the developments within the EU; legitimacy and confirmation of domestic 
policies received through cooperation; and the importance of one’s influence and 
reputation within the EU, was taking place. Accordingly, this feature was added to the 
path-dependent process to point out that some signs of change towards a more European 
orientation were recognised. Ultimately, the end result of the analysis was a model that 
followed Thelen’s suggestion to apply certain tools from rational choice to better 
understand “the logic of the situation and the responses of the actors” within “the 
process-orientated analysis that is characteristic of historical institutionalism” (1999: 
400). 
 
7.2. Potential Gain ‘In the Long Run’ 
 
The results of the analysis showed that both COI agencies regard the EU harmonisation 
process for COI as predominantly a problem-solving process, and they can be described 
as moderately willing to participate in this process because only one out of five forms of 
cooperation, the Eurasil meetings, is currently judged as beneficial. Nevertheless, this 
points to the likelihood of both COI agencies participating in the harmonisation process 
in future. However, the agencies scored low on the two other aspects of the 
harmonisation process because domestic cultural orientation showed scepticism towards 
its abilities to set sufficiently high standards in rights to asylum, and showed low interest 
in its community aspect. These low scores act as brakes to change and add support to the 
view that a development towards further cooperation and more harmonised COI is a slow 
process.  
 
Finally, differences between the Norwegian and Danish COI agencies suggest the 
possibility that the Norwegian COI office will be more involved in the harmonisation 
process than the Danish office, due to its more flexible aspects in formal organisation, 
legislation and procedures that are more compatible with the standards proposed by the 
EU. This prediction is strengthened by the fact that the differences between the two cases 
seem to be reinforced by cultural attitudes of positive feedback within the two 
institutions. Ultimately, considering that it is the role of the harmonisation process as a 
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problem-solver that is given most weight by both agencies, it is foreseeable that the 
Norwegian COI agency, despite Norway not being a member of the EU, has more to win 
from cooperation than the Danish COI agency. It is therefore more likely to take active 
part in the harmonisation process of COI in the years to come than the Danish office. The 
latter has proven to have procedures and legislation that are less compatible with EU 
standards Ongoing changes to its legislation do not suggest that these incompatible 
aspects in the field of COI are likely to change in the near future. 
 
7.3. Further Research 
 
The differences in COI products between the Norwegian and Danish COI agencies can be 
said to be all the more surprising when taking into account that this study is a comparison 
of two similar cases in the context of the EU, and that they have had much bilateral 
cooperation between them outside the forums of EU cooperation. In fact, the analysis 
seen from a sociological new institutional perspective showed that the Norwegian and 
Danish COI agencies both figure as model institutions for other COI agencies, especially 
those of the new EU member states. The study of isomorphic processes, as well as further 
comparisons between COI agencies such as comparing the COI of the central and 
typically more closed bureaucracies of Germany and France with the border states of 
Greece, Italy and Spain, and the new eastern-European border states, would provide 
greater insight into the current variation of COI in Europe and the potential for future 
harmonisation of this field. However, the Country of Origin Information of these 
respective agencies would first have to be accessible for research. Such public openness 
to this information seems to be a long way away from current conditions.  
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Annex A 
           Interview Guide84 
 
1. Introduction. 
- Introduce the aim of the study; why this particular person; familiarity with 
their work (vocabulary, current events); anonymity; recording yes/no?  
 
2. Decision-making at the domestic level. 
2.1. Can you guide me through the process of the realisation of a FFM? 
- Who are the parties involved in the decision-making on: when to go; what 
topics to inquire about; which sources to meet; setting up the schedule? 
 
2.2. What is involved in writing a FFM report? 
- Who are the parties involved in the decisions on: writing; format; 
structure; content; access to the reports? 
- What are your thoughts on the differences I have found between the 
Danish/Norwegian reports? 
 
3. Cooperation at the European level. 
3.1.  Can you tell me about your experiences at the Eurasil meetings? 
- Number of times; influence; positive/negative impression; importance? 
- Organisation of participants according to: membership; old/new- big/small 
states; talk of shared goals beyond problem solving? 
 
3.2.   Have the guidelines in this document (show them “EU Common Guidelines for  
    Processing of COI”) had an impact on your work? 
- Criteria, definitions, zones of public versus classified information? 
 
3.3.   How have you used the ESC Database (if at all)? 
- For questions; for answers; listed as an expert? 
- Positive/negative sides to the database? 
 
3.4.  Have you gone on joint FFMs with other COI agencies? 
- Previous negative/positive experiences; future prospects; criteria? 
 
3.5.  Have you any thoughts on the Joint Support Office COI scheduled for 2010? 
- Possible positive outcomes; difficulties; implications for future COI in 
Europe? 
 
4. Conclusion. 
- Do you have anything to add, have I missed something important? 
- Possibility to e-mail if new questions come up? 
                                                
84Numbers represent general main questions, dashes are keywords that represent the follow-up questions.  
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